

# **New York Herald Tribune, May 5, 1945**

## **Tito Resents British Grip on Trieste**

### **Asserts Yugoslavs Freed City, 8th Army Occupied It “Without Permission**

### **Calls for Prompt Mutual Agreement**

### **Says Case May Involve New ‘Greek Tragedy’ ”**

*by the United Press*

*ROME, May 4 -*

British 8th Army troops had entered the disputed Istrian peninsula today and seized Trieste and Gorizia, claimed by both Yugoslavia and Italy, as planes flew over the former battle areas dropping leaflets to isolated enemy troops to inform them of the German capitulation.

British occupation of Trieste and Gorizia will prevent Yugoslav troops from taking the cities and announcing a fait accompli. Yugoslavia claims Italy should lose Trieste and Gorizia as well as Fiume, because of having been an Axis partner. The three cities have been a source of friction between the Slavs and Italians for hundreds of years.

#### **Statement by Tito**

Marshall Tito, of Yugoslavia, issued a statement that New Zealand troops occupied Trieste after its liberation by Yugoslav forces “without our permission.” It warned that the occupation “might have undesirable consequences unless the matter is settled promptly by mutual agreement.”

The statement, constituting a challenge to the Allied High Command for a showdown decision on whether Yugoslav or Allied troops shall occupy Trieste and Gorizia “could not have been occupied by the New Zealand division as both these towns were completely cleared of the enemy by our forces as far back as April 13.”

#### **Italians in Demonstration**

Indicative of strong feeling among Italians about Trieste’s future is the fact that an estimated 20,000 Italians staged a two-and-one-half-hour brawl in Piazza Venezia today, resulting in the injury of fifty persons, two seriously. The demonstrators included three

groups-students favoring Italian Trieste, Communists opposing the students and opposing monarchy, and Italian ex-servicemen sympathizing with the students.

The demonstration was dispersed by American and British military police. No Italian police were in the Piazza Venezia, but they guarded Viminale and Quirinale palaces, where Premier Bonini and Prince Umberto have their respective offices. Two other street clashes between students and Yugoslav sympathizers took place yesterday.

In his order of the day, Marshal Tito announced the capture of the port cities of Fiume and Pola, after eleven days of fierce street fighting. The order said the Istrian peninsula is now completely liberated.

## **Newsweek, May 28, 1945**

### **Yugoslavs' Willful Grab at Trieste Poses Danger for Charter Makers**

#### **Unilateral Action by Tito Points to need for True Accord Among Big Three Powers**

The process called liberation at Warsaw, at Vienna, and before that in the capitals of the Balkans had been seen through a wall which was, at best, reddishly opaque. Most of the time the wall had obscured as well the "serious and disquieting issues" of which Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden spoke so gravely to the House of Commons on his return from San Francisco. Last week, however, the shield-shaped peninsula of Istria at the head of the Adriatic Sea became, for the democratic peoples, an open cross section of much that is wrong with the peace in Europe.

#### **Putsch, Yugoslav Brand:**

In the center of the cross section was Trieste, the great and historic port which is so naturally a feeder harbor for the important supply lines to the Allied armies of occupation in Austria. Ethnologically, Trieste is a bit of Italian sausage bulging from a roll of Slavic hinterland. But ethnology was not the issue of the moment. Again it was a case of whether promises in the Soviet sphere of Eastern and Southeastern Europe are to be kept or broken; whether territorial changes are to await calm international decisions or become simple affairs of grab.

The events at Trieste, in the adjacent Italian district of Venezia Giulia, and in Austrian Carinthia to the north could be reported freely because British and American troops were on hand in comparative strength and American correspondents were there to write about them. From the latter this picture emerged:

Although Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia twice (in July 1944 and in February 1945) agreed to Anglo-American occupation and military government of the territory west of Fiume, his Army of Liberation now had moved right in to stay. In Trieste, Tito's soldiers milled uneasily in the steep streets with the New Zealand Second Division of the British

Eighth Army under Lt. Gen. Sir Bernard C. Freyberg, with a battalion of the American 91st Infantry Division. An Allied Military Government unit idled on the outskirts. But the Yugoslavs were in fact the military governors. They took over property, and conscripted Italians between the ages of 17 and 50. Two thousand Italian Partisans who were in Trieste when the Yugoslavs arrived vanished mysteriously. In all Trieste, which is 85 per cent Italian, no Italian flag flew.

In the Gorizia area of Venezia Giulia, Tito's men arrested some Americans for violating a curfew (on Yugoslav time). The Americans arrested Tito men for looting. Around Gorizia Allied troops encountered Yugoslav roadblocks at Klagenfurt in Austrian Carinthia which Tito also had overrun. Both Allied and Yugoslav military governments issued proclamations.

Politically, the Yugoslavs moved just as fast. A "general assembly of the city of Trieste" was staged the night of May 17, without advance announcement and without benefit of Italians. Polite applause was accorded mention of the Yugoslav and Allied armies, but when the "Soviet military mission" was mentioned, the audience brought down the house. This, said the Yugoslav-controlled newspaper *Nostro Avvenire*, was a historic demonstration of true democracy; Trieste was "a bastion wrenched from reactionary imperialism: the united force of our peoples who won it will know how to defend it against anyone."

Britain and the United States acted swiftly and in unison. While New Zealanders unloaded tanks at Trieste, the British cruiser *Orion* and two destroyers stood off in the harbor and heavy American bombers flew overhead. Marshall Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, Allied commander of the Mediterranean theater, sent his Chief of Staff, Lt. General W.D. Morgan, to Belgrade with a document reminding Tito of his promise to leave and the supply lines northward to strict Anglo-American control and to withdraw his Yugoslavs to Fiume. British and American Government sent identical notes of protest to Tito, carrying the same reminders.

Tito hedged: The situation was now no longer military, but "political," he told General Morgan. He would withdraw from west of the Isonzo River, but not from Trieste, Pola, Gorizia, or Monfalcone. Finally, in reply to the diplomatic notes, he insisted to the Allies; need for ports and communications were protected, and added: the honor of our army and the honor of our country demand the presence of the Yugoslav Army in Istria, Trieste, and the Slovene coastline."

### **Reminder, Explosive:**

Then Alexander exploded. To his entire command on Saturday he sent a special message, "so that you may know the issues which are now at stake." In language extremely simple but entirely undiplomatic, it said that Tito was claiming the disputed sections of Italy and Austria, and that his claims would be weighed impartially and fairly at the peace conference.

But, Alexander went on, "It is Marshal Tito's apparent intention to establish his claims by force of arms and military occupation. Action of this kind would be all too reminiscent of Hitler, Mussolini, and Japan.

**"It is to prevent such actions that we have been fighting this war. We have agreed to work together to seek an orderly and just solution of territorial problems. This is one of cardinal principles...on which our representatives...are now at work at San Francisco..."**

**"I tried my best to come to a friendly agreement with Marshal Tito, but did not succeed...We are now waiting to hear whether Marshal Tito is prepared to cooperate in accepting a peaceful settlement of his territorial claims or whether he will attempt to establish them by force."**

**The significance of Alexander's method of expression to all his troops, including those who forced the last 7,000 Germans at Trieste to surrender-was not lost on anyone. In Belgrade, British and American military and civilian personnel, including the UNRRA mission, were informed to be ready to leave within a few hours.**

## **[United States] War Department General Staff, Military Intelligence Division**

### **Intelligence Review, Issue 1**

**14 Feb 46, pp. 61-63.**

#### **Commission to Study Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Problem**

**The Foreign Ministers' Deputies Commission will arrive shortly in Trieste in an attempt to fix an Italo-Yugoslav boundary which will satisfy the mixed Italian-Slovene population of Venezia Giulia ethnically, economically, and politically. It has not yet become clear to what extent the Soviet Union will back Yugoslav claims to Venezia Giulia. Italo-Slav animosity over the issue has already created a tense atmosphere and caused some bloodshed.**

**Italy obtained control of the entire Istrian Peninsula and the Dalmatian coast by treaty after World War I. Thereafter, the age-old friction between Italians and Yugoslavs was aggravated by Italian atrocities in the conquest of Yugoslavia and by Yugoslav reprisals during the Tito campaign which preceded the German collapse. In May 1945, Yugoslav troops occupied Trieste (at the head of the Adriatic, on the west coast of Istria), and, as a result of subsequent Italo-Slav affrays and cross-charges, Venezia Giulia was divided into two zones, separated by the so-called Morgan Line. The Allied-administered western zone includes Pola and the important port city of Trieste, and has direct communication into Austria; the Yugoslav-controlled eastern zone contains Italy's major resources of mercury, bauxite, and coals**

**Premier De Gasperi has announced Italy's willingness to accept a boundary suggested after World War I by Woodrow Wilson, which would leave Italy with about two-thirds of the Istrian Peninsula, including the principal coal and bauxite deposits, but which would give the Yugoslavs the large cities of Fiume and Zara and the entire Dalmatian coast. Tito claims not only the Dalmatian coast but all of the Venezia Giulia region as well. The Council of Foreign Ministers, unable to decide upon a boundary at its London conference some months ago, recommended that the port of Trieste be internationalized, with the city itself remaining Italian, and that a commission of their deputies be sent to investigate the boundary question. It is this commission which is now preparing to convene.**

The normal population of Venezia Giulia is predominantly Italian in the large cities and Slovene in the hinterland. There are indications that, in preparation for the commission's visit, the Yugoslavs have been attempting to deport Italians. The Russian-trained Italian Communist leader, Palmeiro Togliatti, first supported the Yugoslavs, but has now switched to a pro-Italian stand as a result of his party's loss of prestige last year; The Italian Communist Party of Venezia Giulia is also pro-Italian. This reversal by the Italian Communists, coupled with other reports, indicates that the U.S.S.R. may be withdrawing its original support of Tito's claims. It is possible that the U.S.S.R., which has been demanding a trusteeship of the Italian African colony of Tripolitania, has decided to encourage Italian claims at the expense of Yugoslavia in order to regain Russian prestige in Italy and strengthen the Italian Communist Party.

## Intelligence Review, Issue 3

**28 Feb 46, pp. 30-36.**

The pattern of peace is established only in its broadest terms by international policies and principals; in actual practice, the pattern is woven of compromises and accords reached in resolving one little conflict after another. Important among the current disputes is the one involving the Venezia Giulia area of Italy. Like some which have been settled and many still to be considered, the Venezia Giulia controversy is the whole peace problem in miniature, involving as it does the interests of the victorious Great Powers, those of a vanquished enemy nation, and those of a country once overrun by the Axis — with all those interests inter-related to the basic rights of local ethnic groups, the viewpoints of political systems, the economic realities of world rehabilitation, and the military considerations of tomorrow's balance of power.

### The Area in Question

Venezia Giulia, an area of 3,389 square miles which includes the Istrian Peninsula, has a population of about 1 million. While the cities are predominantly Italian, the rural areas are largely Slovene, but the two groups are approximately equal in numbers. Historically the region was part of the Roman Empire, but from medieval times until 1918 it was under Austrian-Hungarian domination. The secret 1915 Treaty of London (which was repudiated by Woodrow Wilson) awarded Venezia Giulia to Italy. Italian control was recognized in 1918 by the Treaty of St. Germane with Austria and in 1920 by the Treaty of Rapallo with Yugoslavia.

During World War II, the traditional friction between Italians and Yugoslavs was aggravated by Italian atrocities committed during the conquest of Yugoslavia and by Yugoslav reprisals during Tito's campaign preceding the German collapse. In May 1945, Yugoslav troops occupied Trieste, and, as a result of Italo-Slav affrays and cross-claims, Venezia Giulia was divided into two zones, separated by the so-called Morgan Line. (See map.)

Inasmuch as Italy had lost the opportunity afforded her in 1918 of integrating the agricultural Slavs and the urban and maritime Italians, the questions of frontier rectification and population exchanges are now raised. It is doubtful that population exchanges alone would remove Italo-Yugoslav animosity. Should Italy lose all or the bulk of Venezia Giulia,

either by peace treaty or a Yugoslav coup, a revival of pre-1914 irredentism is probable. Such an environment would hardly foster friendly economic and diplomatic intercourse between the two nations; thus a more equitable solution would favor the cause of general peace.

Italian Premier de Gasperi has announced Italy's willingness to accept a boundary suggested after World War I by Woodrow Wilson, which would leave Italy with about two-thirds of the Istrian Peninsula, including the principal mercury, bauxite, and coal deposits, but which would give Yugoslavia the large cities of Fiume and Zara and the entire Dalmatian coast.

Tito claims not only the Dalmatian coast but all of Venezia Giulia and a small area to the West of it as well.

The economic value of Venezia Giulia is based on the following:

- (1) The deep water ports of Trieste, Fiume, and Pola, providing access to central Europe;
- (2) Industries located mainly in Trieste and Fiume, including shipbuilding, oil refineries, chemicals, steel, textiles, cement and food processing;
- (3) Mineral resources, including coal, bauxite, zinc, lead, and mercury;
- (4) Agriculture; and
- (5) Fishing.

The area provided Italy with half of its bauxite, one-third of its coal, and one-sixth of its mercury.

### **Yugoslav Military Strength**

During the period 2-16 February 1946 the Yugoslavs increased their units along the Morgan Line by 150 percent. At the present time there are ten infantry divisions, one armored division, and two KNOJ (Elite Police) brigades there. All the identified new arrivals are Fourth Army units, which have been moved up from the part of Slovenia between Ljubljana and the Morgan Line. However, there have also been reports of units moving north along the Dalmatian Coast and west through Belgrade. With the exception of two infantry divisions, the entire Yugoslav Fourth Army, totaling 110,000 men, is now in Zone "B". Most of the units were at first concentrated in the vicinity of Fiume and Postumia, but are now believed to have fanned out north and south along the Morgan Line and through the Istrian Peninsula. An increase in the movement of new equipment and supplies to units in the Fourth Army has also been noted. These units are believed to be better equipped and manned than others in the Yugoslav Army. "Defensive positions" and semi-permanent fortifications are being erected.

Apparently in justification of these reinforcements of Zone "B", the Russians recently presented to the Security Council a Yugoslav memorandum charging that General Anders' Second Polish Corps had been moved into northeastern Italy and was recruiting elements unfriendly to Yugoslavia.

[XIII (BR) Corps is the Allied force in Zone "A" and northeastern Italy at this time with the 88th (US) Inf Div on the northern segment of the Morgan Line, the 56th London (BR) Inf Div on the southern segment of the Morgan Line, and the 1st (BR) Armd Div to the west in Veneto.]

## **The Quadripartite Commission's Problem**

A commission appointed by the deputies of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R, France, and the United States - the four powers that will eventually determine the Italian peace treaty — is presently authorized to determine pertinent facts upon which a new ethnic Yugoslav-Italian border can be based. This procedure was established when the Council of Foreign Ministers, at its London conference in September 1945, agreed upon internationalization of the port of Trieste, with the city remaining Italian, but was unable to agree upon any settlement of other issues involved. The arrival of the deputies' commission in the area has been delayed, but it will begin its work in the near future.

The commission will seek to resolve the ethnic, economic, and political problems of the mixed Italian-Slovene population of Venezia Giulia. There have been recent indications of a Yugoslav program for the Slovenization of the Yugoslav-occupied area (Zone "B") prior to the arrival of the Commission. This has taken the form of propaganda, census falsification, police brutality toward Italian sympathizers and deportation of Italians. In the area occupied by American and British forces (Zone "A") the Yugoslavs are directing a "war of nerves" against the population. Yugoslav flags and Italian flags bearing red stars are being smuggled in from Ljubljana to be flown in during the commission's visit. Despite Allied Military Government decrees, children in Slovene schools are being indoctrinated along Yugoslav lines. Infiltration of Yugoslav agents into Zone "A" and illegal raids and abductions by their secret police in that zone are also increasing. It has been reported that "in all villages", young people are erecting triumphal arches, decorating windows with pictures of Yugoslav Premier Tito, and writing slogans on walls to show pro-Tito attitudes.

## **Soviet Policy**

Since agreeing to the establishment of the Commission in September 1945, the Soviets have adopted a "hands off" policy toward the Venezia Giulia problem in order to re-establish Russian prestige in Italy and strengthen the Italian Communist Party. This was evidenced by the switch to a pro-Italian stand made by the Russian-trained leader of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti. The Soviet Union may have adopted this aloofness toward Yugoslav demands in order to soften Italian reaction to the Soviet enunciation of its desire for a sole trusteeship of Italy's African colony, Tripolitania. However, the deputies' commission, which was due to arrive in Trieste about 15 February, is being delayed because the U.S.S.R. wants the commission's investigation restricted to Zone "A", which indicates a change in Soviet policy. Should the other three powers accede to the Soviet demand, the bulk of Tito's claims would be granted at the start. This reversal of Soviet policy in favor of Tito will cause an unfavorable reaction in Italy, weaken the Italian Communist Party, and undoubtedly will affect the Italian elections this spring.

The Soviet Union, with its influence over Tito, now probably can be expected to back present Yugoslav aspiration in one of two ways:

(1) By continued refusal to allow the Allied Boundary Commission to enter the Yugoslav-held Zone "B" - thereby nullifying the Commission's power and defeating its mission at the outset; or

(2) By giving Tito a free hand in case of an adverse decision by the Peace Conference, permitting him to take independent action to achieve his own ends in Venezia Giulia. It is

improbable that the Russians would furnish military support to any Yugoslav action, since their chief purpose probably would be to test the determination of the Allies to enforce the decision of the Peace Conference.

Yugoslav action could take either of two forms:

(1) Tito could use the various clandestine, semi-military organizations in Venezia Giulia to instigate "popular uprisings" throughout the area and then declare his Government incapable of checking the "spontaneous reaction" of Yugoslav troops in response to such a "popular appeal"; or

(2) He could direct the pro-Yugoslav groups to foment strikes and disorders which would incapacitate the Allied Military Government in Zone "A" to such an extent that Yugoslav troops would be "forced" to intervene, ostensibly to protect the Slovene and pro-Yugoslav population from alleged Italian imperialistic persecution.

In either case, The Yugoslav Fourth Army is capable of seizing and holding Zone "A" against the British, American, and Italian forces now in northeastern Italy. The Yugoslav Second Army, now based in Zagreb, could assume the defense of the Austrian border and serve as a second line of defense for the forces in Venezia Giulia. However, without Russian aid in the air, the Yugoslav forces would be almost defenseless against Allied air and naval attacks.

## **Newsweek, March 18, 1946**

### **Trieste: Prize City**

In few of the danger spots of this explosive world is the dynamite stacked so high as around Trieste, the picturesque port at the head of the Adriatic and the maritime gateway to Central Europe. Last week an American-British-Russian-French commission to examine rival Italian and Yugoslav claims to Trieste. For the present, the city itself is under the Anglo-American control. But from the nearby mountains, a Yugoslav Communist Army looks impatiently toward the rich prize. And Wladislaw Ander's Polish Exile Army are spoiling for a last fight before their scheduled disbandment.

In Trieste itself a London Times correspondent reported that Slovenes had painted Tito slogans on houses while they waited the arrival of the demarcation commission. Across the line drawn between Allied occupation troops and the Yugoslav forces Marshal Tito had massed ten divisions, including tanks and artillery. The Western Allies had only the British 56th and American 88th Divisions, now both mainly unseasoned troops. There were no Anglo-American reserves nearby, although a Yugoslav brigade was stationed in the Allied area as "compensation to Marshal Tito for his evacuation of Trieste last June."

The Yugoslav Army, aid the Times correspondent, could be in Trieste within a few hours if it chose to cross the line. He further reported: "Gangs of Yugoslav toughs recently have been active every night in the streets of Trieste to reinforce the effect created by the powerful army just beyond the hilltop which overlooks the city. "Italian workmen

already are sending their wives to Italy for safety.”

## **Newsweek, April 8, 1946**

### **EUROPE: Background for Misunderstanding**

Modern wars usually start in Europe. Spectacular disputes elsewhere between the great powers tended to obscure this historical truism. Thus last week Iran dominated the headlines (see Page 32). But at the same time, more fundamental tensions developed rapidly in Europe. There, along a line stretching from Stetin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic and thence down to Greece, the Russians and the Western Powers came up against one another at closer quarters and in more explosive circumstances than in any of the colonial regions (for an opinion on European reactions see Joseph B. Phillips Foreign Tides).

#### **Guns Over Trieste**

The spot where the guns are most likely to go off by themselves continued to be Trieste and the adjoining mountains and farm lands of Venezia Giulia. On March 27 Lt. Gen. William D. Morgan, Allied Mediterranean commander-in-chief, warned Marshal Tito's Yugoslavs, in effect, that any movement by them into Trieste would be regarded by the United States and Britain as an act of war (Newsweek, April 1). That warning constituted the first threat of open hostilities since the end of the late global conflict.

Nevertheless, jittery Italians reported from Trieste that the Yugoslav were increasing their already heavy concentrations in Zone B, the sector of Venezia Giulia they now occupy. For defense at the moment, the British and Americans can call on only two divisions in Zone A, their area. However, the Americans and British might redress the balance by bringing naval power, particularly aircraft carriers, into the Adriatic. This possibility will be underscored for the Yugoslavs' benefit by combined maneuvers, featuring the use of carriers, to be held soon off Spain.

General Morgan's warning against unilateral action in Venezia Giulia was followed by another move intended to keep Tito in no doubt as to American view on this activities. An American note to the Marshal expressed United States concern over the forthcoming trial of Gen. Draja Mikhailovich, informed the Yugoslav Government that several American citizens had volunteered to testify in the captured Chetnik leader's defense, and inquired what facilities could be provided for hearing the American witnesses. Moreover, the State Department had under consideration the publication of a document statement tending to show that Marshal Tito's regime has been far from conspicuous in its observance of inter-Allied treaties and agreements.

There was evidence that Allied pressure was having some effect on the Yugoslav Marshal. Last week, a retiring British diplomat who has been with Tito since the earliest days of his Yugoslav career complained, in a farewell interview, about the regime's anti-British attitude and actions. Surprisingly, Marshal Tito replied that he himself was most anxious to improve Yugoslav-British relations but that he had not been successful in impressing the need for better relations in some of his followers. He confided that the

country was far from unified, especially in the field of foreign relations, and that he was under constant pressure from extremists within his own camp. On parting Tito said: "I trust your impressions of Yugoslavia are not all bad." I shall try to forget most of them," the Briton replied.

### **The Austrian Larder**

The Trieste situation had its repercussions in Austria. The United States Army there was put on the alert. However, the combined British and American forces add up to only 50,000 men as against the 300,000 the Russians maintain in their zone of Austria. American requests to Moscow to reduce the size of its army have gone unanswered. This Red host in itself brought about another serious clash between the Western Allies and Russians—a clash that took place in a spot far from the troubles of Europe—Atlantic City, N.J.

At the UNRRA meeting there (see page 43), the American delegation jammed through, against fierce Soviet opposition, a resolution asking for an end of such practices as the Russians have initiated by maintaining huge forces in Austria, feeding them off the countryside, and allowing UNRRA to support the local population. The Red Army had gone so far as to requisition 125,000 acres of Austrian farmland. The intention apparently was to set up a permanent food supply for permanent Russian garrisons in Austria.

Furthermore, Gen. Mark Clark,, American representative on the Allied Control Council in Vienna, has vetoed any UNRRA relief plan for Austria until the Russians give satisfactory assurances that they will abandon the system of feeding Soviet troops of the country. Significantly, all Russian land requisitions follow the same geographical pattern, forming a strategic corridor from the north to the Yugoslav border. Since the continued refusal of UNRRA aid would cause the gravest hardships to the Austrian people, General Clark may be instructed to withdraw his veto temporarily.

## **New York Daily Mirror, May 8, 1946**

### **Slain Yank is Symbol of Tito's Power**

*by Glenn Neville  
Executive Editor, New York Daily Mirror  
Written Expressly for the Hearst Newspapers*

*Gorizia, Italy, May 7-*

This small sunny city lies just west of the disputed Morgan Line where, last Christmas eve, an American soldier was murdered by two of Tito's men as he repaired a telephone line.

Excellent work by our CIC (counter intelligence corps) established the identity of the murderers. We have photographs and other evidence.

But we have never been able to question the suspects.

Tito, with an army of more than 600,000 men, has refused to deliver them to American authorities, to prosecute them himself, or permit them to be interviewed behind his own lines.

### **Just Another Name for Russia**

The unpunished crime still rankles in the hearts of American military men here.

It symbolizes to them the low ebb of American prestige in this mixed-up corner of Europe where Yugoslavia is just another name for Russia and where the Communist Tito, Stalin's abject puppet, presses his master's claim for the rich Italian province of Venezia-Giulia and the great port of Trieste.

Here, at points where main roads intersect the Morgan Line, American GIs and Yugoslav partisans stare stonily over the barricades

It is a hostile border.

No friendliness is possible

On one occasion, five GIs ventured in the 50-yard "no-man's-land" between road blocks to purchase fresh eggs from a farmhouse.

They were seized and jailed by the Yugoslavs. It took a week to get them back.

### **Division Made Famous by Axis Sally**

There is no secret about our military strength here. We have a division—a new one but a proud one, the "88th," The Blue Devils,—christened and made famous by "Axis Sally," commanded by Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore.

The battle flags of the "88th" do not go back to Second Manassa, or to San Juan Hill, or St. Miheil. But the "88th" was the first all-selective service division of World War II—kids pulled from behind soda fountains, taken from banks and stores and newspaper offices, from farms, from schools and colleges and machine shops.

They were not the United States Army. They were the Army of the United States. As such, the war department watched them closely. It need not have worried.

When the "88th" struck north from Rome, Axis Sally, sister-under-the-skin to Tokyo Rose and radio voice of a dying cause, suddenly lost both her easy, confident manner and her temper; she called the "88th" the "bloodthirsty devils with the blue patch on their shoulders."

The "88th" thanks her for its nickname.

The British have a division, too; the solid, steady, dependable "56 London."

### **Gen. Morgan Top Military Boss**

Top Anglo-American boss is Gen. Sir Henry D. Morgan, supreme Allied commander Mediterranean theater.

Strangely enough, however, neither our glorious "88th" nor Britain's historic "Londoners" is the No. 1 fighting force west of the Morgan Line.

That honor goes to 106,000 homeless men sequestered at various points deep in Italy, who could not be "redeployed" or discharged or sent home.

They have no home to go to.

They are the men of Lt. Gen. Wladyslaw Anders' Polish second corps. They are exiles.

They will not go back to a Poland that is a slave stockade of Soviet Russia.

But, it will be said, many of them have gone back. That is quite true. Some 14,000 of the original force went back. Why? For a very fundamental, human reason. They wanted to find their loved ones-wives, sons, daughters, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters. Blood is thicker than politics.

They are straggling back now. They did not find their families.

This writer went to great pains to seek out General Anders in Italy. I regret to say he will not talk.

"I am a soldier. I am not a politician."

## **Collier's, May 18, 1946**

### **Trieste: Battleground for Peace**

by *Arthur Gaeth*

**With the great powers trying to frame a permanent peace one of their prime headaches is Trieste where British and Russian imperialisms are in conflict**

Conscripts for the Yugoslav army clumped through the streets of Belgrade chanting, "Tito, Tito," in unison as they marched to recruiting points. Crowds on the sidewalks echoed the same chant. Then recruits and spectators in the same rhythm, shouted, "Trieste, Trieste, Trieste," the name of the coveted seaport at the head of the blue Adriatic.

Soldiers and bystanders added the names of other towns and villages of the Julian March which surround the disputed city. The Yugoslavs want more than Trieste. They want its hinterland as well. Trieste itself is overwhelmingly Italian. But its environs are populated by Slavs in about the same proportion.

Long ago, when Trieste was the principal seaport of the vast Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italians shouted the city's names as possessively as Yugoslavs do today. Trieste

was the heart's desire of Italian Irredentism. The city was ceded to Italy as a reward for bolting the Holy Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Germany and joining the Allies in World War I.

Today Yugoslavs have adopted every propaganda trick to sway observers toward Slav aspirations for the Julian March. From Fiume to Abbazia, to Trieste and all the way to Gorizia, the roads are canopied with green Yugoslav arches, pictures of Tito, banners and flags. Even the sad hulk of the once great liner Rex, lying on her broadside in the Yugoslav part of Trieste harbor bears a Tito slogan.

Italians in the Allied part of Trieste and in the town and villages near the port have been hired to place Yugoslav flags in the windows of shops and homes to show their solidarity with Tito's aims. This was done in the hope, apparently, of convincing Allied visitors of the unanimity even among Italians of the desire to make Trieste Yugoslav.

Thus Trieste is the goal of a newborn nationalism that animates Yugoslavs in the new Federated Peoples' Republic. It is also a testing ground in the struggle to consolidate the fruits of victory and work out the problems of formal peace for Europe. It will, sooner or later, become a matter for consideration of the Security Council of the United Nations. And to a large extent, the outcome of the controversy over Trieste rests in the hands of Marshal Tito, leader of the Yugoslav Revolution.

I discussed the issue with Tito during an interview in the Beli Dvor, a Byzantine white castle atop the hill overlooking the once-fashionable Belgrade suburb of Dedinje. The Marshal, born plain Josip Broz fifty-three years ago in a Croatian village, stood before a wall map of the Trieste region. He was immaculate and dignified in his simple gray uniform with one campaign ribbon on his chest. A diamond sparkled on his finger as he talked of the necessity for cordial Yugoslav-American relations and of the reasons for his country's claims. He was aware of Anglo-American opposition to Yugoslav pretensions concerning Trieste.

"Yugoslavia is desirous of establishing closer economic and political relations with the United States because that would also aid in strengthening world peace. It is clear, however, that good relations also depend on the American attitude, for example, toward the realization of certain Yugoslav national interests say in the Julian Marches."

Tito's finger flashed to the map and pointed at Trieste. He spoke determinedly, suddenly more the revolutionary and less the well-groomed, graying intellectual he had appeared to be when I entered.

"The geographic position of Trieste is such," he said, "that it forms an integral part of a geographic entity whose national hinterland is Slovene. Without the Slovene hinterland which completely surrounds Trieste it cannot live.

"Trieste is important to Yugoslavia for economic reasons. It is a great sea harbor, the likes of which Yugoslavia does not possess but which she needs. Yugoslavia needs it, but only so much as it needs Yugoslavia. It is linked with Yugoslavia by commercial and other ties.

"Any other solution would have only negative results in the future. There would be

elements of permanent dissension, of permanent quarrels-in a word, elements for disturbance of the peace-if Trieste, for example were given the status of an (internationalized) city like Danzig.

**“It would be an unacceptable solution if the claims of Italy were satisfied and if Trieste were incorporated into Italy and torn away from Yugoslavia. As a smaller country than Italy, and actually as a victim of Italian aggression during this war, Yugoslavia has the right to claim the area for strategic reasons and to demand that those reasons be (weighed) as elements in favor of the incorporation of Trieste into Yugoslavia.”**

Those same strategic considerations were weighed by Woodrow Wilson and the World War I peacemakers in deciding to award Italy all enemy territory south of the Brenner Pass. In so doing they brought some 350,000 German-speaking Austrians and about as many Slavs under Italian rule. But they secured Italy against attack from the north and northeast by placing the Dolomites and the Alps of the Tyrol between the enemy and the plain of the Julian March and the Po Valley.

Their decision might have been both unjust and unwise, but their modern counterparts, the peacemakers of World War II, will not easily undo what they did. A positive decision either way, for or against Italy or Yugoslavia, will certainly mean trouble between those two countries, now or later.

The Italians are united on at least two major issues: to have republic and to keep Trieste. Even the Italian Communists, inclined at first to follow the party line on Trieste's cession to Yugoslavia, plainly desired by Moscow, have switched to a positive policy of "Trieste Italiana." They, and most Italian parties-Socialist, Action,, Republican and Christian-Democrat-might accept internationalization of the port, giving Yugoslavia and Austria equal rights for its use, it would balk at its transfer to the Yugoslav flag.

Within Trieste itself, the Italian Communists-usually Slav-speaking descendants of parents who became Italians in citizenship only with the World War I peace treaties-have joined the Yugoslavs in the agitation for giving Trieste to Tito as war booty. But Triestine Socialist Party leaders, like doctor Giorgia Buda and Maria Wilfan and Boris Kraigher, of the Italo-Slovene Anti-Fascist Union were opposed both to making Trieste a Yugoslav city and to internationalizing it. One Italian liberation-army general said he could raise a million men to retake Trieste if it were taken from Italy.

The task confronting the peacemakers is, obviously, an extremely difficult one. It would be unjust, on a strictly ethnological basis, to give Trieste to Yugoslavia as at least 70 per cent of the city's 300,000 population is Italian. It is equally unjust for Italy to retain the surrounding territory, which is approximately as overwhelmingly Slav.

Yugoslavia's best argument in favor of its demands is its lack of an adequate port, although internationalized Fiume, an important railhead linked to the main lines carrying the Central European traffic down into the Balkans, is an excellent harbor, fully as large as Trieste, Spalato (or Split) farther down the Dalmatian coast is a good port but is largely isolated.

Italy's best argument for retention of Trieste lies in the assistance rendered to the Allied cause by its partisans, who saved the country's industries from the Germans. But the

peacemakers will be obliged to consider also not only Yugoslavia's desires regarding Trieste, but also the interests of Russia and Great Britain in the Mediterranean.

### **A Nation Governed by a Minority**

To understand the newborn Yugoslav nationalism, the country's appetite for Trieste and the potentialities of a Russo-British struggle for power in the Mediterranean, one must consider the nature of Yugoslavia's war against the Axis and more particularly, of its revolution. Yugoslavia, as such, was a child of the Treaty of Versailles, which united its Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, and Montenegrins and its Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, and Moslem religious groups under a constitutional monarchy handed to the Serb house of Kara Georgevitch. The country became in effect, a Croat-Slovene nation ruled by a Serb minority. The Croats and Slovenes became the permanent opposition.

This fact was important in what happened after Yugoslavia was invaded by the Fascists and the Nazis. The Yugoslav resistance movement split in two, one led by the Communist Tito and his radical followers and the other by the conservative Draja Mihalilovich and his monarchist clique, which collaborated with pro-Axis forces, according to British Intelligence reports.

The war in Yugoslavia ended, however, as a Russian-Communist rather than a British-monarchist victory. Yugoslavia is a Slav nation and its destiny intimately concerns Russia's nascent pan-Slavism, or political unification of the Slav peoples.

Inevitably the Yugoslav Revolution, led by a Tito who'd been trained in the hard school of the Comintern while he was in exile there as a young man, is a collateral descendant of the Red uprising which swept the Czars out of power in Russia a generation ago.

There are, however, important differences between the Russian Revolution and the Yugoslav. Tito and his leaders seem to be working toward a compromise between old-fashioned Western democracy and socialism rather than toward a dictatorship of the proletariat such as exists in the Soviet.

The nation is by no means unanimous in acceptance of Tito's new deal and suffers, at the moment, from profound internal antagonisms. Although Tito's popularity among a large section of the peasant-and working-class masses is undisputed, there isn't quite as much warm affection for him and his plans for socialization of the nation's major sources of wealth, redistribution of the land and other reforms. They shout, "Hocema Tito" in the streets and country lanes, but in the night clubs of Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo and in the homes of the prewar well-to-do, who have most to lose and the least to gain, there is frank hatred of Tito.

So sharply have ideological lines been drawn and so deep are many of the antagonisms that it is extremely difficult to assess what is actually happening in the country. One foreign diplomat put it this way: "There are only Partisans in Yugoslavia-for or against Tito, with people seeing the situation all good or all bad." To clarify some of the issues I went to Tito himself.

Tito lives, ironically, in the palace built by the late King Alexander for his young son, Peter, now and unhappy refugee in London. Prince Paul, the regent during Peter's minority, and his wife, Princess Olga, furnished the salons sumptuously with white goatskin and deerskin furniture, valuable paintings and art objects. Tito's big Alsatian dog, Tiger, howled with annoyance when I entered his master's office. A Servant brought in Rakija (a sort of Yugoslav white mule) and red wine.

"What," I wanted to know, "is your concept of democracy?"-a word used freely by Tito's followers as the goal of Yugoslavia's new constitution. It foresees the free election of representative officials, freedom of speech, and religion and assembly and the right of trial by jury. Its precepts are not, however, currently applied.

"It was necessary," the Marshal admitted, "to take into consideration the internal political and social conditions of Yugoslavia so that it was not possible to carry thorough, at once and completely, the dispositions which had been foreseen earlier by laws (of the Peoples' Republic) and now by the constitution. Elements (of opposition) still exist which have not been assimilated into the present status, the new internal order, which differs much from the former order or old Yugoslavia."

Tito paused a moment to light another cigarette in his small pipe-shaped holder and resumed:

"The democracy of the Federated People's Republic has a deep social root. It assures and makes possible the full development of the large masses of our people-one can say from 85 to 90 per cent of our population. We are looking somewhat skeptically at democracy with a more formal character. We consider that Yugoslavia is no formal democracy, but a real, popular democracy. Because it is not formal but real it differs from Western democracy.

"For example-the worker in Western democratic countries can prosper only so long as he works, but as soon as he loses his job he is abandoned to his own devices. With us, the state is responsible, and every citizen of Yugoslavia is the ward of the entire nation."

### **Fifteen Years from Communism**

So far there was little dissimilarity between the social structure of the nascent Yugoslavia and what exists under the Soviets. I asked Tito how long it would take, in his opinion, to realize the kind of state he envisioned. Once, back in 1936, I asked a Soviet commissar the same question. He estimated it would require 15 years to achieve the total communization of the U.S.S.R.

"I don't think so long a period will be necessary in our country," Tito replied. "Yugoslavia is a peoples' republic. It is not yet a soviet republic. The character of our internal order is a little different that in the Soviet Union. Our changes have followed other lines. They proceeded hand-in-hand with the struggle for liberation against the external enemy, the German invader. Change here has been gradual, coming with the four-year war against the German, Italian and other invaders, but we have made real progress. Much more time would have been needed in a period of peace.

"To be specific, I reckon that our young generation will be educated in the new

spirit within ten years. Young people and children in some sections bore the full weight of this war-so that their re-education will be rather easy. I believe we will achieve that with ten years but naturally, everything depends not only on the internal but on the external political conditions.

“Every state is more or less linked with the general framework of the world society. On what (outside help and encouragement) Yugoslavia receives depends how rapidly or how slowly Yugoslavia will achieve the objectives of its revolution.

“We have private ownership (of property and the means of producing wealth) and we have state ownership. Thus our state distinguishes itself from that which exists in the Soviet Union. Our development has been shorter but it is also more imperfect. There is not yet the soviet authority of the complete social revolution in our country.”

Thus, in his own words, Tito made it clear to the outside world that Yugoslavia is headed for ultimate sovietization. Tito’s concept of democracy, however much some of his aides may liken it to Western concepts, is definitely Marxist. But it was also clear from what he said that what eventually emerges in Yugoslavia will be greatly influenced by other powers. Above all others, America can help to shape Yugoslavia’s democratic destiny.

One of the strongest influences for weaning Yugoslavia away from Mother Russia, regardless of its nonpolitical characters, is the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. About 3,000,000 Yugoslavs on the edge of starvation are alive today due only to the food, clothing and medicines they’ve received from UNRRA. Yugoslavs know that America is the moving spirit and the principal source of UNRRA assistance. Russia saw this early in the game, which was why it opposed entry of UNRRA supplies into Yugoslavia.

But Tito had only praise and gratitude for the services which UNRRA had rendered his people.

“In a word,” he said, “UNRRA has supplied grain and other foodstuffs to those regions of Yugoslavia which suffered most, like Dalmatia, Bosnia and Montenegro. Our government and our people are extremely grateful to the United States for the big help offered us, even to the present day, by UNRRA.”

Tito’s words debunked current reports of Yugoslav ingratitude for UNRRA assistance. In a long inland journey from Belgrade to Sarajevo and the frontier, I found further evidence of the popularity of UNRRA and, by inference, of America.

A drought in 1945 in the most fertile agricultural areas of the country accentuated the food shortage. Literally millions were saved from death by starvation in Dalmatia and Croatia when UNRRA assumed the task of providing food for 3,000,000 and partial relief for 2,000,000 others. The word “UNRRA” is as good as a passport at roadway check stations. The guard examines your cargo and credentials and waves you on with a smile. Petty Yugoslav bureaucrats have sought to play down what UNRRA has meant to the people, but the people know.

I heard much criticism of the diversion of UNRRA goods to the army by Yugoslav black-marketeers and politicians. UNRRA mules, for instance, were supposedly being used

to haul army supplies and artillery. Investigation showed that some UNRRA mules were traded to the Yugoslavs for brood mares with which to restock the depleted farms with draft horses. Charges in anti-Yugoslav circles to the effect that UNRRA grain was found in army warehouses were described as originating in the fact that the army had bought used UNRRA sacks but the grain they contained was not from UNRRA stocks.

Much of the good done by UNRRA in the furtherance of relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, however, has been erased by the American State Department's only partial recognition of the Tito regime and the attitude of some members of the American diplomatic mission here. These are inclined to look askance at the Yugoslav revolution as "Red", and the attitude, not unknown to the Yugoslavs, has not retarded inclination of the country's leaders to turn increasingly eastward for support.

Unquestionably the orientation of Tito's Party of National Liberation and its leadership is communist. With the exception of two noncommunist liberals, the Party hierarchy, many of them fellow exiles of Tito's in the years between the great wars, is Marxist in philosophy and methods. Among the younger leaders, authority often exceeds experience and ability. Trained to violence, the young hotheads often commit excesses in their revolutionary zeal.

### **Hostile to Capitalistic U.S.**

Moscow influence is detectable in the tone of the press and the general outlook and attitude of the bureaucrats in Belgrade. These are openly suspicious and antagonistic toward capitalist America. Their attitude is strengthened by the impatience and lack of understanding of Yugoslav and Balkan history on the part of some of America's official representative here.

For a quarter of a century before World War II, the nation suffered from internecine warfare between the Serbs and the Croats. More than 2,000,000 persons, mostly Croats and Slovenes, served terms in Serb jails. Hundreds of thousands were killed and considerable part of the nation's physical assets were destroyed.

A jeep journey across Croatia to Derventa and then a ride south to Sarajevo brought home to me the fury of that struggle. For a distance of about 150 miles there were no undamaged towns or villages. There the Ustachis of the Ante Pavelitch have sought to wipe out the Serbs. In the rubble of the civil war there were also visible, however, the signs of the Partisans' battle against the Germans. The shells of hundreds of wrecked German trucks still littered the gullies.

The war, however, swung the country violently toward a form of unification. The members of the Party hierarchy, for instance, are representative of every linguist and religious group in the land. There is nevertheless an opposition—"forced unity."

There is, undoubtedly, a class struggle proceeding with the country. It is manifest in the government's efforts to stabilize prices and wages, to install a new income tax system, separate church from state, and in agrarian reforms.

One of the chief sources of opposition to Tito's regime arises from the state's effort to punish the war profiteers. Every afternoon hundreds of trials are held in all the larger

communities. In one case, in a Belgrade district, a young man named Andric was up for black-marketeering before a People's Commission consisting of a lawyer, several workers, a teacher and a professional investigator. Until 1943, Andric worked as a clerk in a wholesale iron business. Then he suddenly branched out himself. Soon he was able to buy property in Dedinje, to purchase an automobile and other unheard-of luxuries.

A recent Yugoslav law decreed that anyone who earned more than 25,000 dinars between April 6, 1941 and May 8, 1945, the day it ended, was liable to have the excess confiscated. Andric tried to avoid declaring his excess profits and the court fined him 500,000 dinars, wiping him out financially. This was the Partisans' way of punishing those who profited from the war, collaborated with the enemy and stayed safely away from the fighting. Such confiscated assets are put into a Reconstruction Fund with which the devastated nation is to be rebuilt. Actually anyone with a business or property who did not fight the Germans-or who for ideological reasons is considered an enemy of the state-is subject to trial and confiscation of his goods and chattels.

Although the law, for the time being-and here is one of the principal differences between the Yugoslav and Russian revolutions-does not call for nationalization of the businesses or industries, the War Profits Commission accomplishes the same ends. The state will eventually come into possession of most of the means of production and distribution, for the owners of almost all major businesses can fall into the category of collaborators as defined by the Commission.

The state already operates a system of national stores known as the "Na-Ma" which sells all kinds of consumers' goods. Prices are theoretically scaled and pegged to fit worker's incomes. At first the peasants stoutly refused to sell foodstuffs to the "Na-Ma" and for about two weeks, last September, the markets in the larger communities were almost empty. Ultimately the peasants discovered that monetary control had shriveled funds available for the black market and that they could not defeat the government. Goods began to move into the national stores.

One of the country's worst difficulties is inflation, which is sweeping the Balkans and Central Europe with disastrous results. The value of the Yugoslav dinar was boldly pegged at 50 to the American dollar. In April, 1945, when the new money was issued, people found they must exchange 100,000 dinars for only 5,000 new ones. All other dinars had to be declared and deposited. The immediate effect of the enforced transactions was to narrow the gap between wage earners and the rich. The wealthy had less money and the wage earners could buy more.

The equalizing process was carried out still further by a reclassification of wages and earnings generally. The wages and salaries of laborers and workers were raised and the earnings of professional and business people were cut. The scrub woman whose average earnings were 600 dinars a month in 1938 was raised to 2,200 dinars a month. On the other hand, the general manager of a store who earned 24,000 dinars a month in 1938 was reduced to 5,600 dinars, or about 23 per cent of his prewar income.

The profiteer trials and the strict wage-price control are not the only manifestations of the general leveling off occurring in the revolutionary Yugoslav economy. The state has the power to tax, which may also mean the power to destroy. And the government doesn't hesitate to use that power.

A typical case of government tax action involved an apartment house owner who had an income of about 226,000 dinars in 1938, two thirds of it profit. Under the new taxes, the apartment-house owner will gross only 98,150 dinars. Not only have his taxes been raised, but rents were cut by 50 per cent. This year the same man will have a net income of 6,400 dinars, while his caretaker will receive an annual stipend of 18,000 plus two cords of firewood free from this employer. Property owners, needless to say, don't like Tito.

Foreign investors similarly face difficult times. The French-owned Bor mines are an example of one type of treatment of foreign interests. The French owners sold their interests in the mines to the Hermann Goeringwerke for twice their stock-market value in gold before Yugoslavia was occupied. The mines have been taken over by Tito's government for nationalization. The French, the Yugoslavs claim, have no further financial interest in the properties.

### **Strict Limitation of Profits**

The British-owned Treptcha mines are an example of another type of treatment. The government will pay the owners for their property, but in making payment, "due consideration will be given," an official explained to me, "to the relationship between the amount of the original investment and paid-up dividends to date. In other words, the owners are likely to receive only the difference, if any, between what they put into the mines and what they've taken out in profits.

The most serious socialization is occurring in land reform. The government is confiscating and redistributing to the peasantry the lands of large church estates, business houses and absentee landowners. In the Volvondina region, thousand of enemy Germans and Hungarians have been dispossessed. Families from Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia are to be settled in their places. Each family received from 20 to 35 acres, depending on the fertility of the land and the size of the family.

Some peasants aren't taking well to the agrarian reforms. Yugoslav farmers are a fiercely individualistic lot. I talked to some of them in the Belgrade railroad station where freight cars were filled with families being moved with their few possessions to the Volvondia. Most of them were from the mountainous southwestern part of the country. One fellow didn't like the damp flatlands of his prospective home. He also didn't like having to join a co-operative to obtain his tools and seed.

Another said that from what he'd heard, his house had all the comforts he required but he, too, balked at having to work in a co-operative.

"I want to work when I want," he said, "sleep when I want and sit in a coffeehouse when I want. I may have a good house, but I am the slave of the state."

Yugoslav leaders insist that they're taking "the individualism of the farmer in consideration" in the resettlement plan but it remains to be seen whether a Zadruga, or co-operative system, will be widely accepted by the peasants or whether they will be coerced into collectivism as were some of the richer peasants of the U.S.S.R.

One of the most revolutionary changes wrought by the Tito regime is in the

separation of the Catholic church and Orthodox church and the state. The government has ended the churches' monopoly of education and is supervising marriages. It has introduced civil divorce courts. Church leaders, naturally, oppose Tito's efforts, and the Catholics roundly denounced him in a pastoral letter last September. the letter protested "persecution of the clergy," the closing of church schools and colleges, the decrees making the study of the catechism optional, and the confiscation of larger church lands. Tito's antagonism toward the church stems, in part, from the fact that many priests were on the side of the Ustachis. I asked Tito what the church could expect at the hands of the regime.

"There is no conflict between the state and the Catholic clergy in general," he said, "but there exists a struggle against one part of the Catholic clergy in Croatia, which is hostile to the Federated Peoples' Republic. The Catholic and other clergies have no difficulty in exercising their religious duties and functions. Religion is free in our country. The state will hinder only those individual priests, or groups of priests, who join negative (opposition) political combinations or who would impede the normal progress of our country."

There is, as in Russia no free press in Yugoslavia. All publications support the government. Foreign correspondents are free to send out what reports they wish, but at their own risk. Censorship is curative but not preventative. Russian influence is more directly visible in the Yugoslav press than in any other single aspect of Yugoslav life.

There are other evidences of close ties to the Soviet Union, including the presence of considerable number of Russian civilians and of some troops. the Yugoslavs seem to be running their own affairs, but the Russians are present as big brothers.

The fact that the Yugoslavs belong to the same family of Slavs as the Russians, however, should not be overlooked by anyone attempting to make an objective valuation of the situation. One night recently a Russian colonel started talking and he took the paternal attitude toward the whole Yugoslav problem. He complained about the stupidity of the petty bureaucracy. But, with a certain amount of cynicism, acquired the experience to run their affairs smoothly.

## **Second Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris, April 25 to May 16, 1945 [excerpts only]**

**[Note: This document was gotten from the Yale Avalon Project and may be viewed in its entirety on the following website:**

**[<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade20.htm>]**

### **Report by Secretary Byrnes, May 20, 1946**

The greatest struggle was over the Italian treaty, and the greatest issue involved in

that treaty was the fate of Trieste and adjacent territory along the western shore of the Istrian Peninsula. The American Delegation, supported by the French and British, urged that Trieste and adjacent territory which are predominantly Italian should remain with Italy, and the predominantly Slavic hinterland should go to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union argued strongly that Trieste and adjacent territory should not be cut off from its immediate hinterland. While it admitted that a few cities and towns along the coast were predominantly Italian, it urged that the Istrian Peninsula should be regarded as a whole and that so regarded it was predominantly Yugoslav. This view was also urged by Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet union further urged that greater consideration should be given to the Yugoslav claims than to the Italian claims because, while Italy as one of the Axis partners was responsible for bringing on the war against the Allies and for the loss of thousands of Allied lives, Yugoslavia had fought on the Allied side throughout the: war and suffered from the attacks of- Italy.

As neither the soviets nor ourselves were prepared to -yield, we then proposed that the issue be left to the Peace Conference, but the Soviets would not agree.

This left us in a more serious dilemma than most people realize. We could make a separate peace with Italy, leaving her Trieste, but the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments and possible others would not accept that treaty.

If we made a separate peace, the Soviet and Yugoslav Governments would undoubtedly demand that Italy make a separate peace with them, ceding Trieste to Yugoslavia. If Italy refused, it is not difficult to foresee the difficulties which would arise.

Even if no one of us presented a treaty to Italy, a disarmed Italy could hold Trieste against the Army of Yugoslavia only so long as our troops held it for her.

In an effort to break this deadlock the French informally suggested that Trieste and adjacent territory be separated from Italy but not ceded to Yugoslavia, and that its security and integrity be internationally guaranteed.

At first no one like this proposal. But the more it was studied the more it seemed to offer a reasonable basis for agreement. It was recalled that before Italy entered World War I she had proposed that the Trieste area should become an autonomous state.

Our delegation insisted that the area should be protected by the United Nations and not by joint agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia as the Soviets proposed, and not by the four principal Allied powers as suggested by the French. Our proposals were accepted.

The proposal as finally agreed upon leaves Gorizia and Monfalcone with Italy in the north and includes within the Free Territory of Trieste the rest of the area west of the agreed ethnic line.

It is true that the Free Territory of Trieste is predominantly Italian in the city and predominantly Slav outside the city. But neither the Italians nor the Slavs in this territory are placed under alien rule. They are given home rule. The people will elect their own

Assembly and the Assembly will elect the officials to administer the laws. They will be subject to supervision only by the United Nations Security Council and by an impartial governor appointed by the Security Council.

The prosperity and welfare of Trieste are linked not only with Italy but with Yugoslavia and the countries of central Europe. It is the natural outlet of central Europe to the Mediterranean. The only railroads entering Trieste come through Yugoslavia and are controlled by Yugoslavia. Representatives of that Government asserted that if Trieste were given to Italy they would divert traffic to Fiume or some other port in Yugoslavia.

Because of the bad feeling between the two peoples in that area, the control by the United Nations may prove to be the best means of preventing armed conflict and relieving tension.

If the area were joined either with Italy or Yugoslavia, its political and economic relations with the other would suffer. Its industries might be unable to attract the necessary capital, and labor might have difficulty finding employment.

If friendly relations are maintained between the Free Territory of Trieste and her neighbors than; would be the case if it were joined: either with Italy or Yugoslavia.

I am convinced that the agreed solution to the problem of Trieste, is fair and workable if the peoples most concerned work together to make it so. Unless they work together, there can be no solution.

## **Newsweek, May 20, 1946**

### **CONFERENCE: Bitter Words, Startled Feelings**

By last week at the Paris Foreign Ministers Conference, the Russians had remade the painful discovery that first angered them at UN sessions in New York-that the United States was now the chief antagonist of the Soviet Unions. This, however, was not according to plan. For Moscow's intent, according to remarks make by Generalissimo Stalin to foreign diplomats, was to appease America and concentrate on Great Britain. Now, probably as a result of its miscarried diplomacy, the Russians suddenly turned conciliatory again, for the moment at least.

Before that, in the formal meetings around the Luxembourg Palace tables, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and Foreign Minister Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff had waged an often bitter battle of words. Every day newspaper correspondents-better informed than at any previous conference-reported new disagreements. But even these formal exchanges did not reflect the full depth of American-Soviet differences as much as one private party that was out of bounds to the press.

It was supposed to be a pleasant social occasion-a private dinner for Byrnes in Molotoff's hotel suite. Foreign Vice Minister Andrei Vyshinsky and interpreter Nikolai Pavloff assisted their chief Ben Cohen and Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen of the State Department came with Secretary Brynes.

Over coffee and liqueurs Molotoff amiably suggested that the time had come to break the deadlock of the conference. The Soviets, he said, were willing to yield on reparations and make adjustments on the Italian colonies. If only Byrnes would agree to give Trieste to the Yugoslavs, the conference would result in a spectacular success.

Byrnes' answer was as unexpected as it was emphatic. "We in the United States," he said, "are not used to bartering away the freedom of peoples for reparations or frontier lines."

Molotoff momentarily forgot his role of host. In a bitter diatribe he denounced Byrnes' "high moral tone." He snapped: "The United States has troops in every Latin American country, in Iceland, in Egypt, and in the Azores. What is more I know you are trying to get bases even closer to the Soviet Union-in Iran and in Turkey."

### **They Were Asked:**

Without losing his temper, Byrnes explained that the "troops," in Latin America, Egypt, Iceland, and the Azores amounted in each case to no more than a few hundred mechanics and laborers supervising the removal of wartime installations. He termed the suggestion of American bases in Turkey and Iran as "fantastic." He then went into a full description of the size and character of Russian troops in each friendly or enemy country they occupy. (the latest authoritative estimates: 250,000 each in Bulgaria and Hungary, 450,000 in Rumania, 300,000 each in Poland and Austria.)

"Yes," Molotoff countered, "but wherever our troops are stationed they are welcomed by the local populations. Banquets are given for our commanders and spontaneous demonstrations mark their public appearances. Have the Icelanders ever arranged a banquet for their American commanders? Why even your Fascist stooge Salazar is trying to get rid of your troops in the Azores."

"That may be so," Byrnes quietly retorted, "but our troops in friendly countries have always been invited by the governments concerned. And that is more than you can say for the Red Army, Mr. Molotoff."

### **Whiskey Sour:**

Secretary Byrnes tried humor as well as forceful words on Foreign Minister Molotoff-with even less result. At a cocktail party in the American Embassy he suggested: "We ought to have the conference start at 8 every night and have a cocktail party first at 6 p.m. and maybe we would agree on things." Molotoff thought for a few seconds and replied: "Yes. But we should have the conference at 9 o'clock."

Byrnes thereupon tried to persuade the Russian to drink the whisky which he was eyeing with evident distrust.

"Why don't you drink it? Vodka is much stronger."

"No it is not."

“Anyway, you made me drink vodka last night. You ought to at least drink a toast”.

“Molotoff took a condescending sip and Byrnes exulted: “If you drink enough of this Bourbon, you’ll sign a protocol.”

Molotoff actually downed two drinks and then bravely shifted to champagne.

Sen. Tom Connally, one of Byrnes’ advisers, also tackled Molotoff. He asked Nikolai Pavloff, the Soviet interpreter, if the Foreign Minister could say “yes” in any language. Pavloff burst into laughter and translated the question for Molotoff. He laughed-but that was all.

### **Valse Trieste**

When Foreign Minister Vyachesloff M. Molotoff ends a statement at the Paris foreign ministers’ meeting, he customarily says in Russian: “I’ve finished.” Then Nikolai Pavloff, his interpreters, barks in English: “I’ve finished.” The French interpreter adds a shrill: “*Fini.*” Last week when Molotoff ended a destructive statement on one of Secretary Byrnes’ proposals, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, presiding over the session, jumped in promptly with: “Finished?”

Bevin’s query very nearly described the conference itself. Affairs went so badly at the beginning of the week that they could hardly get worse. But then they did actually improve as day followed wearying day at the Luxembourg Palace.

In deep gloom on Monday of last week, the foreign ministers confessed failure on critical features of the Italian treaty-reparations, colonies, and most of all, Trieste. So they gave up Italy altogether on Tuesday and turned to the Balkans. They promptly settled one item: return of Transylvania from Hungary to Rumania. But this merely ratified an action the Russians had already taken. When they come to other Balkan issues the four were again at loggerheads.

In such an atmosphere Byrnes suggested that the full-dress, 21-nation peace conference be called for June 15, despite failure to agree on preliminary draft treaties. In hope born of desperation, he felt that 21 nations might agree where four couldn’t, that seventeen “fresh minds” might concoct solutions where four tired and irritable men had haggled each other to a standstill. But Molotoff would give the proposal qualified endorsement, with vitiating amendments that would still require the Big Four to agree in advance and to dominate the conference.

Of all the issues the hardest to crack remained, that of Trieste. No one had yet found a way to reconcile Russia’s insistence that the strategic North Adriatic port be given to its satellite, Yugoslavia, with the western Allies’ stubborn determination to keep the city Italian. All week Molotoff tried to work out private deals. As bait, he dangled before Byrnes and the Italian Premier, Alcide de Gasperi, the possibility of concessions on the colonial question.

Finally, on May 10, he declared that Russia would abandon its demand for an exclusive trusteeship in Tripolitania, which had aroused intense British opposition. Instead,

the Soviets would accept the French compromise proposal for former Italian colonies: Italian administration of United Nations trusteeships. This concession immediately proposed optimism at the conference table. But it did not lessen opposition to the Soviet demands on Trieste.

In making a public gesture toward compromise on the colonies, Molotoff also had a hidden purpose: to embarrass Britain. Bevin had proposed immediate independence of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; now he would either have to renege on that offer, and thereby incur Arab wrath, or risk Russian charges of obstructionism on the Council.

### **Significance**

The Soviet concessions on Italian colonies to some extent revived optimism about the Foreign Minister Conference. However, these concessions were in themselves part of the hard bargaining on fundamental issues which produced the conference's previous disagreements. The unyielding stands taken on these issues reached a peak in the dispute over Trieste.

Trieste took on this great importance partly because of its economic and strategic position. Through the great port at the head of the Adriatic funnels much of the overseas commerce from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Its acquisition by Yugoslavia would complete Russian economic hegemony in this part of the world. Also, Trieste has extensive shipbuilding yards and is the headquarters for insurance companies and banks with interests throughout the world.

But beyond this, Trieste has become a symbol to both the Anglo-Americans and the Russians. Yielding on the subject of Trieste would in the eyes of either side constitute a sort of diplomatic Munich. The Anglo-Americans have made Trieste the touchstone of Secretary Byrnes' policy of dealing with Russia with "firmness and patience." Thus yielding Trieste to the Yugoslavs would be interpreted throughout Western Europe and particularly in Italy as a sign of Anglo-American weakness. Communism, for the moment on the decline in the west, might gain renewed strength.

Soviet prestige is probably even more deeply involved than that of the United States and Britain. Russia's ability to gain Trieste for Yugoslavia has become a test of Soviet power to further the expansion of the Communist-dominated states of Eastern Europe. In this respect Communist propaganda has probably overreached itself, to the embarrassment of the Russians. A Newsweek correspondent in Belgrade cabled this account of the situation produced by runaway propaganda:

"About 2,000 people, mostly young are marching fifteen abreast below my window shouting: 'We will give out lives but never Trieste! Yes, yes, Trieste! Yugoslavia Trieste!'. This sort of thing has been going on for weeks and even months. But it has increased so much in the past few days that it has the making of a first-class crisis. Those usually well versed in Balkan politics fear popular feeling has been whipped up to such a point that more serious trouble may develop as early as this coming week."

Trieste also underlined a fundamental problem that the Communists have so far failed to solve-how to reconcile the international Communism with nationalism. For the present the Russians have adopted the compromise of having local Communist parties

support local nationalism. Thus Yugoslav Communist demand Trieste while Italian Communists support Italian claims to it. German Communists demand a unified Reich; French Communist support a policy of detaching the Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany. The dangers of such tactics to fool the people were pointed out long ago by Abraham Lincoln.

## **Newsweek, July 1, 1946**

### **Is a Red Coup Planned in Trieste?**

The pictures below illustrate the military tension that prevails in Venezia Giulia and its great port of Trieste. That tension was reflected strongly, if indirectly, in the Paris foreign ministers' meeting when the Russians proposed placing the internal situation in Italy on the agenda, on the grounds that the disorders accompanying the abolition of the monarchy might constitute a menace to peace. Edward Weintal, Newsweek diplomatic correspondent, sends the following informal analysis of how this Soviet move may be connected with the explosive Trieste issue and why it is causing the American and British conferees more concern than any other problem so far discussed at the meeting: As soon as Molotoff smilingly suggested this unexpected addition to the agenda, both Byrnes and Bevin realized that there was something more to the innocent-sounding proposal than met the eye. Reports from their ambassadors in Rome promptly confirmed their suspicions. The situation in Italy, the ambassadors said was remarkably calm. Premier Alcide De Gasperi expected no more trouble from any source after King Humbert's departure ended the monarchy issue. General Raffaele Cadorna, the Italian Chief of Staff, fully shared the Premier's view. And so did American and British consuls stationed in various Italian cities.

#### **In search of a Menace:**

However, there were two dark spots on this otherwise bright Italian picture. Headlines in the Communist newspaper Unita continued to scream about the imminence of civil war. And the Soviet Ambassador, Mikhail Kostileff, eagerly confided to his diplomatic colleagues that far-flung plots were being hatched in Southern Italy by Monarchists and members of the Common Many party of Guglielmo Giannini.

United States and British officials agree that at present only one event could lead to this civil war—a Yugoslav coup in Venezia Giulia if the foreign ministers' decisions should favor Italy on the Trieste question. De Gasperi then would be forced to resign and Italy would be thrown into turmoil. The questions bothering Byrnes and Bevin in Paris are these: Is Molotoff about to make a grandiose gesture of yielding on Trieste, only to have the council's decision annulled by a "spontaneous" Tito coup? Is he building up a case against "Fascists" to excuse "retaliation" by Communists? Is that the arrangement made with Tito during his latest Moscow visit?

Until Molotoff produces a better reason for placing a nonexistent Italian "situation" on the agenda of the Paris conference, the American and British delegations will incline to the belief that the answer to all three questions is affirmative.

# Associated Press, July 13, 1946

## **Yanks, Yugoslavs In Border Battle**

### **U.S. Patrols Kills 2 Tito Soldiers**

*GORIZIA, Italy, July 13 (AP)-*

The U.S. 88th Division announced today that an American army patrol killed two Yugoslav soldiers in skirmishes yesterday after a Yugoslav patrol opened fire when it was caught west of the Morgan line.

The line divides the British-American zone from the Yugoslav zone of occupation in disputed Venezia Giulia. It extends north from Punta Grossa, a prominent headland four miles south of Trieste, to Gorizia, Caporetto and Ratece on the Italian-Yugoslav-Austrian border.

### **Troops on Alert**

The 88th Division's headquarters said the skirmishes developed after the Yugoslavs crossed the line near Aurisina, in the Isonzo River valley southeast of Caporetto, which is itself 22 miles north of Gorizia.

American troops in the zone were ordered on the alert.

The official statement said:

"On July 12, a Yugoslav patrol which crossed the Morgan line near Aurisina, southeast of Caporetto, was sighted by a United States outpost.

### **Yanks Fired On**

"An American officered patrol which immediately investigated the violation of the line was fired on by the Yugoslavs at a point approximately 300 yards from the Morgan line in Zone A.

"Acting on instructions to fire only when fired upon, the U.S. patrol returned the fire. After a brief exchange of firing, one of the Yugoslav soldiers was found dead.

"The U.S. patrol continued to advance until another Yugoslav patrol was encountered which apparently was intent on ambushing the U.S. patrol.

"Later reports confirmed by 88th Division headquarters state that a second Yugoslav soldier was killed in the latter part of the action."

# Intelligence Review, Issue 26

8 Aug 46, pp. 32-34.

## **Yugoslav-Italian Border Settlement Complicated**

Early in July the Council of Foreign Ministers reached a compromise settlement concerning the Yugoslav-Italian border. They agreed that: (1) All territory east of the ethnic boundary proposed by the French should be ceded by Italy to Yugoslavia; (2) Trieste and its environs should be internationalized, the Free Territory of Trieste to be constituted within the French line between Duino and Cittanova; (3) the Security Council of the United Nations should assure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory; (4) the provisional government and the permanent statute of the Free Territory should guarantee the principles of universal suffrage, democratic government, and the fundamental freedoms of religion, press, language, schools, and access to public services.; and (5) a special commission representing the Big Four should prepare a preliminary report concerning the provisional government and permanent statute for Trieste for the Council of Foreign Ministers which, in turn, would present recommendations to the Peace Conference.

## **Complications Arise**

The implications of this broad basic agreement have given rise to numerous complications which indicate that a final settlement may not be reached for some time. The four members of the special commission have not reached agreement of what is meant by "internationalization". The Soviet conception of "internationalization" actually would make the Free Territory of Trieste part of the area of Eastern Europe under Soviet hegemony. Yugoslavia has gone even farther. The Yugoslav statement, submitted to the commission by Dr. Aleks Bebler, flatly rejected the proposed internationalization, but added that, if internationalization must be carried out, there should be a "real union" with Yugoslavia. "Real union", as proposed by the Yugoslavs, would take the form of the appointment of a governor by Yugoslavia, a customs and monetary union between the Free Territory and Yugoslavia, a common railway administration managed by the Yugoslav railways, a Yugoslav free zone in the port of Trieste under sole Yugoslav jurisdiction, and Yugoslav representation abroad for the Free Territory. Dr. Bebler also suggested that the provisional government be formed from the pro-Yugoslav liberation committees and political groups now operating in Zone "A" outside the Allied Military Government (See Int. Rev. No. 18, page 11.).

The Italians, probably with British support, have argued against these Yugoslav proposals. They maintain that the institutions created in Zone "A" under the AMG provide a satisfactory basis for the transitional regime, and urge that Italy represent the Free Territory abroad, and that Trieste should be in a customs and monetary union with Italy. Foreign Minister-designate Pietro Nenni of Italy has also been contacting various delegations at the Paris Peace Conference in an effort to get the Free Territory expanded to include Pola and the western Istrian coast.

## **Other Problems To Be Solved**

Certain other problems remain to be solved, largely in connection with the transition from

Allied occupation in Zone "A" to the establishment of the international administration. The question of the size and composition of the security force for the Free Territory, both during and after the transitional period, has not yet been resolved. The transfer of both Italians and Yugoslavs who do not wish to remain in Trieste or Venezia Giulia, under the proposed arrangement, to the country of their selection must be arranged. A revision of the Morgan-Jovanovic agreement among the Yugoslavs, British, and Americans must still be worked out with a view to eliminating the Yugoslav detachment in Zone "A" and permitting realignment of Yugoslav and Allied forces along the line proposed by the French instead of along the present Morgan Line.

## **United Press, August 20, 1946**

### **Firing on Flier Stiffens U.S. Stand on Tito**

*WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 (UP)-*

Congressional spokesmen demanded today that Marshal Tito's partisan government be brought to task for firing on American planes and Allied troops.

Chairman Sol Bloom (D) of New York of the House foreign affairs committee, who usually reflects state department opinion, said there was no question of war involved.

It was believed that a very strong statement of Yugoslavia's militant actions might be forthcoming from the state department in a warning to the Yugoslavs that any future attacks on U.S. planes would result in vigorous action.

### **Denounce Attack**

Informed sources said, however, that drastic action would not be taken, or diplomatic relations broken. But, they said, Yugoslavia would be made to understand that the United States will not be pushed around.

In an unusually blunt statement, U.S. Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Jr. in Belgrade already has denounced the first attack on an American transport plane as "wicked, inexcusable and deliberate." If investigation proves that the latest attack was by Yugoslav fighters, an even sharper statement may be forthcoming.

The Yugoslavs shot down one U.S. transport-an Army C-47-10 days ago. Another C-47 was reported missing yesterday. It was last heard from when its crew messaged that their plane was being fired upon over Yugoslav territory.

### **Relations Strained**

The incidents-coupled with the shooting of two Yugoslav soldiers in a skirmish with U.S. patrols on the Trieste border last month-have curdled the already sour relations between the two countries.

Congressional sources insisted that the time has passed for dilatory U.S. action regarding the incident.

Bloom said that delay in acting would only encourage the Partisans to keep shooting down U.S. planes.

“Something should be done right now,” he said. “We must insist on a halt to this sort of thing right away.

“There is no question of war involved. It no more means war than did the Panay incident. Who would go to war with Yugoslavia? Their action is not unfriendly-just foolish. Of course, if we don’t take action they will probably go on doing it.

Rep. Leo Allen (R) of Illinois, a member of the powerful GOP steering committee who agreed with Bloom, said:

“This would be a good time to assert ourselves most emphatically.”

## **Detroit News, August 22, 1946**

### **Trieste Time Bomb Ticks Away at Paris**

#### **Conferees Soon Will Take Up Proposal for Free Territory Under UN Guarantee**

*by Russell Barnes  
(Staff Correspondent of the Detroit News)*

*Paris, Aug. 21-*

The explosive problem of the future status of Trieste, expected to be one of the most troublesome questions to come before the Paris Peace Conference because it affects not only relations between Italy and Yugoslavia but also between the western powers and the Russian bloc, is moving into the conference foreground.

American draft proposals for creation of the Free Territory of Trieste have been submitted to the conference secretariat. The Italian Territorial and Political Committee is still struggling with the preamble to the Italian peace treaty, with the Italians attempting to have war guilt references softened, but when this is out of the way the committee will tackle revision of the Italian frontiers, including arrangements for Trieste

#### **Boundaries Defined**

American proposals for organization of the Free Territory of Trieste are interpreted by the United States delegation as being not amendments to the Italian treaty draft prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers, but a practical implementation of decisions taken by the council which were never cast in legal form.

The first of two articles of the American proposal establish the Free Territory of

Trieste, define its boundaries and provide that its integrity and independence shall be guaranteed by the UN Security Council.

The next four articles provide for relinquishment of Italian sovereignty.

### **Free Port Provided**

The next article provides for creation of a free port with in the Free Territory of Trieste. The remainder of the document establishes conditions of citizenship.

According to best information, the Big Four agrees on the principle of establishment of the Free Territory of Trieste as contained in the American proposals.

The principle was accepted formally by the United States, Russia, Britain, and France not only in the Council of Foreign Ministers but in the Italian draft treaty submitted to the conference by the Big Four.

### **Big 4 To Hold Firm**

The Peace Conference is free to make any recommendations for solution of the Trieste problem it desires, but it appears now that the Big Four will stand solidly behind their proposal to create a Free Territory of Trieste, with a free port to furnish a sea outlet for Central Europe and the Danube Valley, which should mean that the Big Four plan will prevail.

Differences exist, however, among the Big Four delegations as to how the area should be organized. The Russians are urging that the free port be divided into exclusive Italian and Yugoslav zones.

The United States, Britain and France want transport lines between Trieste and Central European points cleared so that goods could be sent in bond without payment of duties. The Russians are said to agree in principle but to contend that arrangements should be made only when other interested governments are present.

**[Lines are missing from the clipping at this point]**

citizen, whereas other delegations urge that he be appointed by the UN governor to take the issue out of local politics.

The Russians insist that the international commission for the free port should act as a board of directors, but other delegations feel it should be only a supervisory and not an administrative body.

The Russians would like to add Albania, Romania, Bulgaria and Poland to the proposed commission, although they obviously would have little practical interest in the free port.

Other delegations prefer to restrict commission membership to Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Czechoslovakia-states which could use the port's facilities.

# Detroit News, September 2, 1946

## Morgan Line Closely Guarded, but Easy to Cross

by John A. Thale

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*On The Morgan Line Istrian Peninsula, Sept. 2-*

This famed line, dividing British-American and Yugoslav occupation forces in Venezia Giulia, probably is as thinly drawn as any military line ever was.

"It is by no means mouse-proof," admitted a high-ranking spokesman for the American 88th Infantry Division headquarters in Gorizia.

Pro-Italian and pro-Yugoslav forces on both sides of the line are constantly accusing each other of carrying on smuggling operations across the line.

The Italians are most vociferous in charging that the Yugoslavs sneak arms, foodstuffs and money across the border in the British-American zone, to be used in opposing Allied Military Government operations.

Reading of clashes between outposts and patrols which have strayed across the line, of persons being picked up and detained lengthily for illegally entering one zone or the other, the average person is inclined to think of the Morgan Line as an impenetrable gun-studded iron curtain.

### Easy to Slip Through

Actually, on the British-American side, only the main routes crossing the line are strictly controlled. The Morgan Line runs from the Adriatic shore, a little below Trieste, over mountains and valleys to the Austrian border.

Twoscore outposts manned by tommygun-armed British and American troops, stretch along the line's 60-mile length. Patrols operate along jeep trails and other paths between the main outposts.

But, the barren, rocky fields and wooded slopes in between outposts offer ideal cover for anyone who wants to slip across. Military officials frankly admit that there is considerable illegal traffic on mountain trails.

"I caught a fellow the other night," said a corporal at one outpost. "He was slipping across where the line ran through the field. The funny thing was that he had a pass too. But, he said that he lived up near there, and decided to slip across, rather than go out of his way to come through the control post."

### Pays to Know English

The corporal, in the Army less than a year, is typical of many, American soldiers now guarding the Morgan line. He was in the Army five months in the States then was shipped to Italy. He has been with the 88th Infantry for four months, and is looking forward to completing his nine months so that he can go home. But, despite the prevalence of recruits, the 88th under Maj. Gen. Bryant Moore, remains a smart military outfit.

A stocky, swarthy peasant stopped at the barred gate while the corporal checked his pass, and then waved him onward.

"I almost tangled with that one the other night," the corporal commented. "He didn't understand me when I told him to stop."

On the Morgan Line, it pays either to understand English or to be exceedingly cautious.

### **Traffic Heavy**

On the main routes, railroad crossing types of barriers are constantly being raised and lowered. There is a steady stream of barefooted women carrying market bags, oxcarts loaded with farm produce, buses headed toward Trieste from villages in the back country, and private vehicles.

At the post on the main road to Ljubijana, Yugoslavia one sergeant recalled a record day this week, when the post passed some 2,600 persons.

"They were having some sort of Yugoslav festival over on the other side," he explained. "The Yugoslavs on this side really flocked over. We passed 695 people in one hour.

Those having a reason to cross the line can get a pass from Allied or Yugoslav authorities. The inspection is not so stiff on the American side. Unless there is some reason for suspicion, American sentries do not make a personal search. Vehicles are inspected fairly thoroughly for hidden arms.

### **No-Mans Land**

Children, especially on the Yugoslav side, pay no attention to the Morgan Line at all. Until they are 12, they don't need a pass.

They wander back and forth, ducking under the crossbars, begging chewing gum, candy and anything else from the GIs.

## **Life, September 2, 1946**

### **Trouble Spots Plague the World**

Month after month Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia loudly insisted that his people

couldn't live without Trieste. His delegates even walked out of the Paris conference on this issue. Last week Tito suddenly offered to forego his claims.

He would give up Trieste, he said, in exchange for the nearby Italian city of Gorizia. The Italian Government promptly pointed out that Tito was offering to swap a city he didn't possess for one the peace conference had already decided not to give him. Furthermore, a settlement "out of court" would cancel the Allies plan to create a Free Territory of Trieste, administered under the UN Security Council. Without international supervision, the pro-Yugoslav element in the city could then maneuver for a further attachment to Yugoslavia.

Tito's offer was not made any more attractive to the Italians by his way of making it-in personal discussions with Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communists. It reached the government of Premier Alcide De Gasperi only through an interview given to the Communist newspaper, *Unita*, by Togliatti, who added that the proposed deal also included release of Italian prisoners in Yugoslavia and a bilateral trade pact.

Communists claimed the Tito offer was evidence that Italy could gain more by stringing along with the Reds than by supporting De Gasperi and the moderate parties, who had won nothing at Paris. On Nov. 10, the voters of Rome Florence, Genoa, Turin, Palermo, and 137 smaller cities had a chance to express themselves. They did so in a small election turnout by giving a slight early lead to the parties of the left. But the principal trend appeared to be one merely of political apathy, which even the dramatic injection of the Trieste issue failed to shake.

## **Boston Herald, September 2, 1946**

### **Tito Pens Apologies, Rants Over Indemnity**

*BELGRADE, Sept. 1-*

Marshal Tito in a written note delivered to the American embassy here this morning formally apologized for the death of five U.S. flyers and gave assurance that such incident would not happen again, it was authoritatively learned today. Tito stated that he had issued orders forbidding the repetition of the regrettable incidents of Aug. 9 and 19 when two American C-47 transport planes were forced down and shot down with a loss of five lives.

While American officials were reluctant to comment or even acknowledge having had the note, its receipt was confirmed on the authority of a reliable Yugoslav source.

The note was a written statement of the verbal reply made to Ambassador Richard Patterson by Tito at their meeting at Bled on Aug. 22d when the ambassador handed the Yugoslav premier the American ultimatum.

At the second meeting with Tito yesterday, Patterson was believed to have presented the Yugoslav government with indemnity claims for loss of life and property. It was a stormy meeting, according to the Yugoslav source, although the Americans denied this. However it is believed that the denial was a courtesy gesture.

The Yugoslavs feel that repeated violations of their territory does not warrant the stiff claims to be presented. They consider the affair regrettable but do not want to be "blackmailed to satisfy reactionary elements in the United States."

## **Newsweek, December 2, 1946**

### **MINISTERS: Labor Lost**

In their New York conference room in the Waldorf-Astoria Tower, the Big Four foreign ministers went into the fifth hour of the tenth day of bickering over the wording of the statue for the Free Territory of Trieste. Only the chairman for the day, Maurice Couve de Murville of France, remained unruffled. He rose and said: "Gentlemen, I think we have exhausted today's agenda." Secretary Byrnes remarked: "I am exhausted, too."

For once, however, Byrnes had apparently out-exhausted Foreign Minister Molotoff. From Russia's iron negotiator, Byrnes had wrung these concessions:

The governor of Trieste is to be vested with authority: (1) to hire and fire the chief of police; (2) to veto any treaty with any foreign country which, "in his judgment, "conflicts with Trieste's rights as a free state; (3) to propose measures to the Security Council which he considers necessary to protect the regime, and (4) to appoint Trieste's judges from candidates proposed by the city council.

Molotoff will drop his idea of a customs union for Trieste and Yugoslavia and modify his scheme for Italian Yugoslav "free zones" within the port. His demand that Yugoslavia hold a half interest in Trieste's railway system was likewise rebuffed. Although cognizant that Yugoslav will always be able to choke Trieste's inland trade (two of its three railways go through Yugoslavia), Byrnes and Foreign Secretary Bevin got a commitment from Molotoff that "a close working agreement between Trieste and Yugoslavia would suffice.

But on one point Molotoff refused to budge: Foreign (United States and British) troops must evacuate the Trieste area 90 days after the Italian treaty goes into force. Standing pat on his oft-heard contention that the continued presence of foreign troops would show "a lack of confidence" in the inhabitants of the free territory, and that they would constitute pressure at election time Molotoff gave a flat "no" to Byrnes' compromise plan that the troops should leave 45 days after the governor notifies the Security Council that they are no longer needed to maintain order.

Thus, for Byrnes, in the end it turned out to be exhaustion's labor lost. It was a discouraged group of men who emerged from the Waldorf-Astoria conference room on Nov. 22. Final agreement still appeared as remote as it had on the day of their first meeting-Nov. 4.

# **United Nations Weekly Bulletin, January 21, 1947**

## **Security Council and Trieste**

### **Annexes to Proposed Peace Treaty With Italy Approved**

The Security Council has approved the annexes to the proposed peace treaty with Italy relating to the creation and government of the Free Territory of Trieste, including an arrangement for the Free Port, and has accepted the responsibilities devolving upon it under those annexes.

A decision to approve the three documents and to accept the responsibilities was reached on January 10 after the matter had been discussed by the Security Council at two meetings on January 7 and 10.

Doubt was expressed by some representatives, including N.J.O. Makin, President of the Council, as the representative of Australia, whether the Charter of the United Nations gave the Council power to accept the responsibilities. On this ground Mr. Makin abstained from voting on the resolution that was finally adopted. All other members of the Council voted affirmatively.

At the meeting on January 10, A. A. Sobloev, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs, submitted on behalf of the Secretary-General a statement with regard to the legal issues raised in connection with the consideration by the Council of the three instruments relating to the Free Territory of Trieste.

The legal questions raised were:

1. The authority of the Security Council to accept the responsibilities imposed by these instruments.
2. The obligation of Members of the United Nations to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council pursuant to these instruments.

The statement found that the Council did have the authority to assume the responsibilities and that Members of the United Nations were under an obligation to carry out the decisions of the Council.

The documents sent by the Chairman of the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Security Council for approval before January 15 were the instrument for the provisional regime of the Free Territory of Trieste, the permanent statute for the Free Territory and the instrument for the Free Port of Trieste.

### **New members welcomed**

At the meeting of the Security Council on January 7, at which the representatives of the new members of the Council, Belgium, Colombia and Syria, were welcomed for the first time, Herschel V. Johnson of the United States explained that because the Secretary of State of the United States was the Chairman of the Council of Foreign Ministers during its

meeting in New York, it had fallen to him, under instructions from the Secretary of State, to bring the matter before the Council.

The problem of Trieste was one of the most thorny and controversial questions discussed in the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Johnson said. A just solution to this problem and a tracing of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia was certainly the keystone of a peace settlement with Italy.

### **Questions raised by Australia**

Referring to the constitutional questions raised by the proposals, Mr. Makin declared that for the Security Council to assure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory of Trieste entailed other responsibilities which would mean in effect that the Council would act as the supreme governing body of the territory and would have the ultimate authority over the functioning of the government which would be established by the permanent statute.

At the Paris Peace Conference, Mr. Makin said the Australian delegation had suggested that the integrity and independence of Trieste should be given special protection in the form of an undertaking of the parties to the Italian Peace Treaty to refrain from the threat of force or the use of force against the Free Territory.

During discussions in Paris it had pointed out that the assurance by the Council of the integrity and independence of the Free Territory might prove to be an illusory assurance, inasmuch as the extent of the protection given by the Council would depend entirely on whatever use was made by the permanent members of the Council of their right of "veto" In any crisis the "veto" might be used to prevent the Council from acting in a way which would give promised protection, and if such a case arose, world public opinion would find that the promises of the peace settlement in respect of Trieste had been misleading.

Mr. Makin continued that Chapters VI and VII of the charter did not authorize the Council to give any general guarantee of integrity and independence to a particular territory: that only in the particular circumstances referred to in those chapters did or could the Council acquire jurisdiction. Before the Council might act, he said, there must be a dispute or situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute or threat to the peace or breach of the peace. These powers of the Council under the charter operated independently of peace treaties drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers, and they operated in respect of all territories, including Trieste.

### **"Grave precedent"**

The proposals before the Security Council, however, were to the effect that the Council should accept various new responsibilities and, in particular, the responsibility of assuring the integrity and the independence of the Free Territory. The acceptance of such responsibilities was clearly not authorized by the Charter, Mr. Makin stated. No amendment of the responsibilities in the absence of such an amendment would be a grave precedent, affecting all Members of the United Nations.

He asked further what countries would be bound by the obligation to ensure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory.

Faris el-Khouri of Syria also asked whence the Council could derive its authority to take direct administration of any state or territory.

In reply to Mr. Makin and Mr. el-Khouri, Andrei A. Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. stated the power to assume responsibility in respect of the execution of the task outlined in the documents was given to the Council in a whole series of articles contained in the Charter and in particular by Article 24.

Remarking that very difficult questions might often arise in which it really would be necessary to turn to the Security Council for assistance, Sir Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom said he hoped the Council need not say that it could not accept responsibilities and duties because they were not provided for in the Charter. He himself thought that Article 24 was sufficiently widely drawn.

He questioned the statement that Trieste would be directly administered by the Council, pointing out that the Council would have a general control over the administration and, if any difficulties control over them be appealed to, but it was not being asked actually to undertake any direct, absolute administration.

### **Of Concern to Council**

Mr. Johnson reiterated that the problem of Trieste had rightly been brought to the Security Council, for any spot on earth where, for whatever reason, conflicts might break out, was a spot of legitimate concern to the Council.

The only possible solution to the problem of Trieste was internationalization. Thus there would be an independent bit of territory situated between two neighbors who desired it-not in part but in whole. Such an internationalized strip of territory must be guaranteed, and it seemed to him for more in the spirit of the times and of the world organization which all were trying to build up that the Security Council, representing the United Nations and soon, it was hoped, the world, should be the body charged with powers that had been engaged in the war or any arbitrarily "big power as a so-called trustee."

The Council, he continued, was the body responsible for the safety and well-being of the people of the Trieste area, responsible for the safety of their territory and responsible that no international conflict arose from that territory. The proposed statute lay down a system of government which would be as representative as practicable. The Security Council would exercise watchfulness and vigilance over the administration of that territory primarily to see that the human rights of the inhabitants were preserved.

Mr. Johnson then presented a draft resolution which was the basis for the resolution that was finally adopted on January 10.

Alexandre Paroldi of France remarked that it was his opinion that the Charter did give general powers to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and the Council should not interpret the Charter in a restricted manner, having respect, for instance, to the conception of the sovereignty of a state. If this were done the impression might be given to the public opinion of the world that the Council was evading a responsibility which was clearly a responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, he said.

## **Statement of Secretary-General**

It was at the meeting of January 10 that Mr. Sobolev read the statement on behalf of the Secretary-General as follows:

**"1. *Authority of the Security Council.*** It has been suggested that it would be contrary to the Charter for the Security Council to accept the responsibilities proposed to be placed on it by the permanent statute for the Free Territory of Trieste and the two related instruments. This position has been suggested on the ground that the powers of the Security Council are limited to the specific powers granted in Chapters VI, VII, VII, and XII of the Charter, and that these specific powers do not vest the Council with sufficient authority to undertake the responsibilities imposed by the instruments in question.

"In view of the importance of the issue raised, the Secretary-General has felt bound to make a statement which may throw light on the constitutional questions presented. Paragraph 1 of Article 24 provides: "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security , and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." The words "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security," coupled with the phrase "acts on their behalf, constitute a grant of power sufficiently wide to enable the Security Council to approve the documents in question and to assume the responsibilities arising therefrom.

"Furthermore, the records of the San Francisco Conference demonstrate that the powers of the Council under Article 24 are not restricted to the specific grants of authority contained in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. In particular, the Secretary-General wishes to invite attention to the discussion at the 11th meeting of Committee III/1 at San Francisco wherein it was clearly recognized by all of the delegates that the Security Council was not restricted to the specific powers set forth in Chapters, VI, VII, VIII, and XII. I have in mind Document 597, Committee III/1/30. It will be noted that this discussion concerned a proposed amendment to limit the obligation of Members to accept decisions of the Council solely to those decisions made under the proponents and opponents of this amendment, recognized that the authority of the Council was not restricted to such specific powers. It was recognized in this discussion that the responsibility to maintain peace and security carried with it a power to discharge this responsibility. This power, it was noted, was not unlimited but subject to the purposes and principles of the organization.

"It is apparent that this discussion reflects a basic conception of the Charter, namely, that the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Charter."

**"II. *Obligation of the Members to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council.*** The question has been raised as to 'what countries will be bound by the obligation to insure the integrity and independence of the Free Territory.' The answer to this is clear. Article 24 provides that in carrying out its duties, the Security Council acts on behalf of Members of the United Nations. Moreover, Article 25 expressly provides that 'the

Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.'

"The record at San Francisco also demonstrates that this paragraph applies to all of the decisions of the Security Council. As indicated above, there was a proposal in Committee III/1 to limit this obligation solely to those decisions of the Council undertaken pursuant to the specific powers enumerated in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII of the Charter. This amendment was put to a vote in the Committee and rejected (Document 597), III/1/30). The rejection of this amendment is clear evidence that the obligation of the Members to carry out the decisions of the Security Council applies equally to decisions made under Article 24 as to the decisions made under the grant of specific powers."

### **Emphasis on political necessities**

Mr. Makin, commenting on the replies that had been made to the specific objections he had raised, said he thought they did not dispose of the constitutional arguments, but rather tended to place the chief emphasis on the political necessities of the present situations.

The real issue, he stated, was whether, if there was general competence of the Security Council under Article 24 in respect of matters affecting international peace and security, this competence was of such a character as to cover those precise functions which the Council would be required to undertake after the setting up of the Free Territory of Trieste.

He pointed out that the proposed statute designated the Security Council as the supreme administrative and legislative authority and gave it wide powers, not only to assure the integrity and independence of the Territory in the international sphere and in its international relations, but also to ensure the maintenance of public order and security and good conduct of its government in ordinary domestic affairs.

That question might affect the peace or the welfare and good government of the Territory without, in any sense affecting international peace and security.

### **Had rejected guarantee**

He recalled too, that both the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences rejected proposals for the inclusion in the purposes and principles of the United Nations of a guarantee of territorial integrity and chose instead a method by which Members undertook not to use force or threat of force against the integrity or independence of a territory.

Mr. Makin concluded that while his delegation had not been convinced by the answers given to the constitutional points raised, he would not obstruct or delay the proceedings of the Council and would not vote against the majority but would abstain from voting.

Mr. Parodi contended that the Council would be acting in full conformity with the principles and the spirit of the Charter in taking upon itself the responsibilities in connection with Trieste

He referred in particular to Article 42 which he pointed out gave the Council very wide and broad powers. In fact it spoke of possible demonstrations of measure of forces. He contended that if the Council had the primary responsibility of keeping peace and security in the work, if it had such wide powers as those outlined in Article 42, surely it was justified in taking the responsibilities as suggested by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The decision to approve the annexes and to accept the responsibilities was reached after a lengthy discussion of the wording of the resolution along procedural lines.

**[Inserted within a box within this article is the following:]**

**Responsibilities Devolving up Security Council under Annexes to Proposed Peace Treaty with Italy**

Under the proposed permanent statute for the Free Territory of Trieste, the integrity and independence of the Free Territory are to be assured by the Security Council. This responsibility implies that the Council must ensure the observance of the statute, in particular the protection of the basic human rights of the inhabitants, and must ensure the maintenance of public order and security in the Free Territory.

No armed forces, except under direction of the Security Council, are to be allowed in the Free Territory.

A Governor is to be appointed by the Security Council after consultation with the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy. He must not be a citizen of either country or of the Free Territory. He will be appointed for five years and may be reappointed. His salary and allowances will be borne by the United Nations.

If the Security Council considers that the Governor has failed to carry out his duties, it may suspend him and, under the appropriate safeguards of investigation and hearing, dismiss him from office. In the event of his suspension or dismissal or in the event of his death or disability the Security Council may designate or appoint another person to act a Provisional Governor until the Governor recovers from his disability or a new Governor is appointed.

If in the opinion of the Governor any provisions of the Constitution (which is to be established in accordance with democratic principles and adopted by a Constituent Assembly with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast) proposed by the Constituent Assembly or any subsequent amendments are in contradiction to the statute he may prevent their entry into force, subject to reference to the Security Council if the Assembly does not accept his view and recommendations.

The Governor, as the representative of the Security Council, will be responsible for supervising the observance of the statute, including the protection of basic human rights of the inhabitants and for ensuring that public order and security are maintained by the Government of the Free Territory in accordance with the statute, the Constitution and the laws of the Free Territory.

**ANNUAL REPORTS TO COUNCIL**

The Governor is to present to the Security Council annual reports concerning the operation of the statute and the performance of his duties.

Not only may legislation be initiated by members of the Popular Assembly and by the Council of Government, but also by the Governor in matters which in his view affect the responsibilities of the Security Council in assuring the integrity and independence of the Free Territory.

If the Assembly makes manifest its refusal to withdraw legislation which has been returned to it by the Governor or to amend it in conformity with his comments or recommendations, the Governor must immediately report the matter to the Security Council unless he is prepared to withdraw his comments or recommendations, in which case the law will be promulgated forthwith. The Governor will likewise transmit without delay to the Security Council any communication which the Assembly may wish to make to the Council on the matter.

Legislation which forms the subject of a report to the Security Council under such provisions may be promulgated only by the direction of the Security Council.

The Governor may require the Council of Government to suspend administrative measures which in his view conflict with his responsibilities as defined in the statute. Should the Council of Government object, the Governor may suspend these administrative measures, and the Governor or the Council of Government may refer the whole question to the Security Council for decision.

In matters affecting his responsibilities as defined in the statute, the Governor may propose to the Council of Government the adoption of any administrative measures. Should the Council of Government not accept such proposals, the Governor may refer the matter to the Security Council for decision.

### **IN CASES OF EMERGENCY**

In order that he may carry out his responsibilities to the Security Council, the Governor may, in cases which in his opinion permit of no delay, and which threaten the independence or integrity of the Free Territory, public order or respect of human rights, directly order and require the execution of appropriate measures subject to an immediate report thereon being made by him to the Security Council. In such circumstances the Governor may himself assume, if he deems it necessary, control of the security services.

The Popular Assembly may petition the Security Council concerning any exercise by the Governor of such powers.

In the performance of their duties, the Governor and his staff must not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority except the Security Council.

The statute is to constitute the permanent statute of the Free Territory, subject to any amendment which may be made in the future by the Security Council. Petitions of the amendment of the statute may be presented to the Security Council by the Popular Assembly upon a vote taken by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast.

The statute is to come into force on a date to be determined by the Security Council.

### **PROVISIONAL REGIME**

In the meantime the provisions of the instrument for the provisional regime of the Free Territory are to apply. The Governor is to assume office at the earliest possible moment after entry into force of the peace treaty with Italy, to which the permanent statute and the instrument for the provisional regime are annexes.

Under the instrument for the provisional regime the governor is to address his reports directly to the President of the Security Council and, through that channel, is to supply the Security Council with all necessary information on the administration of the Free Territory.

From the date of the coming into force of the treaty, troops stationed in the Free Territory must not exceed 5,000 men for the United Kingdom, 5,000 men for the United States and 5,000 men for Yugoslavia. They are to be placed at the disposal of the Governor for a period of 90 days after his assumption of office in the Free Territory. As from the end of that period, they will cease to be at the disposal of the Governor and will be withdrawn from the Territory with a further period of 45 days, unless the Governor advises the Security Council that, in the interests of the Territory, some or all of them should not, in his view, be withdrawn.

In this event the troops required by the Governor will remain until not later than 45 days after the Governor has advised the Security Council that the security services can maintain internal order in the Territory without the assistance of foreign troops.

The Governor at any time may call upon the commanders of these contingents for support, and such support must be given promptly. Each commander will have the right to report to his government the instructions which he has from the Governor of the contents of such reports. The government concerned will have the right to refuse the participation of its forces in the operation in question, informing the Security Council accordingly.

Elections of members of the Constituent Assembly are to be held not later than four months after the Governor's assumption of office. In case this is technically impossible, the Governor is to report to the Security Council.

### **INSTRUMENT FOR FREE PORT**

Under the instrument for the Free Port of Trieste, the administration of the Free Port is to be carried on by a Director of the Free Port who will represent it as a juridical person. The Council of Government will submit to the Governor a list of qualified candidates for the post of Director, and the Governor will appoint the Director from among the candidates presented to him after consultation with the Council of the Government. In case of disagreement the matter is to be referred to the Security Council.

Proposals for amendments to the instrument for the Free Port may be submitted to the Security Council by the Council of Government of the Free Territory or by three or more states represented on the International Commission of the Free Port. An amendment

approved by the Security Council will enter into force on the date determined by the Security Council.

**[The following was contained in yet another box in the same article]**

## **Security Council and Trieste**

The following information is in addition to that carried in the *Weekly Bulletin*, Vol. 2, No. 2, under the heading, "Responsibilities Devolving upon Security Council under Annexes to Proposed Peace Treaty with Italy." The annexes relate to the creation and government of the Free Territory of Trieste, including an arrangement for the Free Port, and comprise an instrument for the provisional regime of the Free Territory, the permanent statute for the Free Territory and an instrument for the Free Port. Under the permanent statute the integrity and independence of the Free Territory are to be assured by the Security Council.

Article 2 of the instrument for the provisional regime of the Free Territory provides that the Governor and the Provisional Council of Government selected by him "shall exercise their functions in the manner laid down in the provisions of the permanent statute as and when these provisions prove to be applicable and in so far as they are not superseded by the present instrument. Likewise all other provisions of the permanent statute shall be applicable during the period of the provisional regime as and when these provisions prove to be applicable and in so far as they are not superseded by the present instrument. The Governor's actions will be guided mainly by the needs of the population and its well-being." Responsibilities during the period of the provisional regime are, therefore, not limited to those defined in the instrument for the provisional regime, in so far as provisions of the permanent statute may prove to be applicable.

The approval by the Security Council of the permanent statute and of the instrument for the Free Port will also allow the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint, if necessary, the third member of a commission of which would deal with a possible dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the permanent statute (Article 36 of the statute) or of a commission which would deal with a possible dispute relating to the interpretation or execution of the instrument for the Free Port (Article 24 of the instrument).

**Intelligence Review, Issue 53,  
20 Feb 47, pp. 16-22.**

### **Feature Section**

#### **The Security Council and Trieste**

The United Nations' Security Council, on last 10 January, approved the three annexes to the Italian Peace Treaty establishing the Free Territory of Trieste and the Free Port of Trieste. (See map on page 18.) These documents are (1) Annex VI, Permanent Statute of the Free Territory of Trieste; (2) Annex VII, Instrument for The Provisional Regime of the Free Territory of Trieste; Annex VIII, Instrument for the Free Port of Trieste. The assignment to the Security Council of responsibility for the future of Trieste is set forth in Article 21 (Sec. III) of the Italian Treaty. The "Allied and Associated Powers" and Italy

recognize the Free Territory of Trieste and agree "that its integrity and independence shall be assured by the Security Council ..." The Free Territory shall be governed by the provisional regime established by the Council of Foreign Ministers and approved by the Security Council. This government shall remain until the Security Council effects the establishment of a government under the Permanent Statute.

### **Objections in the Security Council**

When the documents were presented for the approval of the Security Council, some U.N. representatives expressed doubt as to whether the Charter gives the Security Council power to accept responsibility for the Trieste area or not. Mr. N.J.O. Makin, Australian representative and President of the Council during January, stated that, in accepting the duty assigned to it by the Treaty, the Council would, in effect, become the supreme governing body of the territory and city, and the ultimate authority over its government and internal affairs. At Paris, the Australians had pointed out that, whether the Charter authorized such power for the Security Council or not, there was still another objection—the veto. In a crisis the veto could prevent the Security Council from executing the mandate of the Treaty; therefore, Charter revision of the veto right must precede the assumption of such an obligation. The Australian representative denied that Chapters VI and VII of the Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression respectively.) authorized the Council to give any guarantees of independence or integrity to a territory. Makin urged either the amendment of the Charter authorizing the acceptance of the treaty provisions or, lacking an amendment, an effort by the signatories to the treaty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the Free Territory.

The Syrian representative on the Security Council also questioned the authority of the Council. The obligation of the U.N. member States to accept and carry out the decision of the Security Council in respect to the Italian Treaty also was regarded skeptically.

A statement submitted on behalf of the Secretary-General by A.A. Sobolev, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council affairs, found that the Council had the authority to assume the responsibilities, and that the member States obligated to execute the decisions of the Council. Representatives of the Big Four also supported the treaty provisions. Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Union representative, pointed particularly to Article 24 of the Charter. ("In order to assure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf ... specific powers granted ... for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII." The latter two refer to Regional Arrangements and Agencies, and International Trusteeship, respectively.) Sir Alexander Cadogan of the United Kingdom agreed that the Article was sufficiently broad to cover the problem. The United States representative, Herschel Johnson, asserted that any potential trouble area is rightly the concern of the Security Council. International territory requires international guarantees, not Big Power "trusteeship", he said. Alexandre Paroli of France agreed that the Charter gives the Council broad powers, and advised against restrictive interpretation of the Charter. When the vote was taken, Australia abstained, and the other 10 members approved the Trieste provisions of the Treaty.

### **The Security Council's Responsibilities**

## **General.**

Under the Permanent Statute, the Security Council assures the following: (1) the "integrity and independence" of the Free Territory; (2) the protection of the "basic human rights of the inhabitants"; and (3) the maintenance of internal order and security. No armed forces, except those under the direction of the Security Council, are to enter the Territory.

## **The Governor.**

The Governor, an international official responsible only to the Security Council, shall be appointed by that body after it has consulted the Yugoslav and Italian Governments; he must not be a citizen of Yugoslavia, Italy, or the Free Territory; his salary and allowances are to be paid by the U.N. The Security Council may suspend or dismiss the Governor from office and appoint his successor. (It is the United States view that the Governor should not be a national of the Big Five. For Data on some of those mentioned for the Governorship, see Significant Personalities, page 62.)

## **Responsibilities of the Governor Under the Permanent Statute.**

The Governor is to: (1) prevent the entry into force of any legislative or administrative measures he deems in contradiction of the Statute, and refer the question to the Security Council, if the Popular Assembly or Council of Government rejects his views; (2) appoint members to the judiciary from candidates named by the Council (or from other persons after consultation with that group); (3) investigate and dismiss judges; (4) enforce: observance of the Statute, the protection of basic human rights, and the maintenance of public order and security; (5) in an emergency, he may assume all control and take any measures he sees fit to fulfill his duties; (6) submit an annual report to the Security Council; and (7) appoint the Director of the Free Port.

## **Conclusions**

The internationalization of Trieste was one of the most difficult questions debated by the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference. No nation was satisfied with the compromise solution which will now go into effect. For several weeks during the sessions of the Peace Conference, the Soviet Union and the Western Powers disagreed on basic concepts of internationalization: (1) the U.S.S.R. urged that the selection of the territory's Governor be made unilaterally by Yugoslavia; (2) the representatives of the Soviet Union and her satellites fought to prevent the inclusion of guarantees of protection of the basic human rights of freedom of religion, press, speech, assembly, and political opinion; (3) The Soviets supported the Yugoslav demand that the "international" territory be linked to Yugoslavia by trade, customs union, and currency; (4) in reply to a plea by the Italian Government that the area of the Free Territory be extended for ethnic reasons to include dominantly Italian towns along the coast of Venezia Giulia, Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Vishinsky stated that, although his government would support the previous commitments of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it was the opinion of the U.S.S.R. that Yugoslavia was entitled to the the whole of Istria, including Trieste, the Foreign Minister's compromise, he said, represented a "minimum of justice".

The compromise, arrived at with such difficulty, does not promise to be the solution of

the problem. The United Nations Military Staff Committee has been involved in procedural debates for more than a year, and progress in these and substantive matters has been consistently blocked by the Soviet member. Present indications are that the Military Staff Committee and the Security Council may fail to make effective progress toward the organization of a U.N. armed force for some time to come. This condition seriously weakens the Italian Treaty, and creates bewilderment and doubt regarding the intent of the principal signatories concerned. In addition to this apparently impotent guarantee, the territory is dependent on the sufferance of the permanent members of the Security Council, who have obstructionist capabilities through the veto.

The following factors suggest that, unless the East and the West can effect firm agreement on this and other problems before the U.N., a de facto government subservient to the East may well arise: (1) the present ineffectiveness of the U.N. as an enforcement agent; (2) the attitude of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia as demonstrated at the peace conference; (3) the present unrest in the territory; and (4) the withdrawal of Western troops, when the Governor recommends such action.

## **Oregon State, March 1, 1947**

### **Trieste Line Stirs Worry**

TRIESTE, Feb. 28 (AP)-

Control of the frontier of the newly formed Trieste free state during the initial period of the change in government is causing some concern among Anglo-American officers here.

Of the 70-mile long border only two miles face Italy. The remainder faces Yugoslavia and most of it, at first, will be under Yugoslav control. Some Anglo-American intelligence officers have expressed fears that such control might tend to be lax, to put it mildly.

As one American officer suggested: "It would be much better to have the Yugoslavs controlling the Italian frontier. Then we could be sure that not a fly could get through without authority."

With the move of American troops from positions along the Morgan line separating Anglo-American and Yugoslav occupation zones in Venezia Giulia large area administered by Anglo-American military government will go to Yugoslavia.

### **Italians Getting Out**

These areas include British-occupied Pola at the southern tip of the Istrian peninsula, whose 28,000 Italian inhabitants are fleeing from future Yugoslav rule, and the predominantly Slovene-speaking upper Isonzo valley, source of most of Trieste's power supply.

The Isonzo valley area lies roughly north of Gorizia, where the 88th division has its

headquarters, and parallels the Morgan line, It is entirely in the American control zone, as far as Tarvisio on the Austrian frontier. Troops guarding this sector of the Morgan line belong to the 351st U.S. infantry regiment, which has been designated the major component of the "Blue Devil brigade," the American force in the free state.

The Blue Devils will be commanded by Brig. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, deputy division commander. The brigade's occupation area will consist of a narrow strip of the free state stretching northwest from Trieste.

### **Combine Still Talked**

There will be few Americans in the center of Trieste itself, which falls within the area of the British 24th guards brigade.

The Yugoslav section of the free state occupation force, unless the governor decides otherwise, will remain in its present position in that part of the free state zone it now occupies.

Question of a combined command for the occupation forces is still under consideration by the joint chiefs of staff in Washington. At present, all British troops in Venezia Giulia are under British Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding, who has an exclusively British staff.

Many senior British officers would like a similar arrangement for the free state force, "for the sake of convenience," and many American officers favor a combined Anglo-American command, provided it is headed by an American.

### **Slavs Air Suspicions**

There are weighty arguments against a joint Anglo-American commander, some officers here say, including the probability of Yugoslav objections, the danger of splitting the free state into two isolated zones and the fact that the statute makes each of the three commanders directly responsible to the government.

Yugoslav officers attached to the Anglo-American forces are known to have expressed suspicion of a joint Anglo-American force which would outnumber the Yugoslav force two to one.

The question of rank also is involved. There is a possibility of a "rank race," with each nation trying to place its force under an officer outranking the others.

# **Blue Devil, March 1, 1947**

## **“TRUST” To Be Blue Devil Brigade’s Short Title Activation to Follow Ratification of Treaty**

“TRUST” is the symbolic designation of the Blue Devil Brigade which will form the American Contingent of 5,000 troops in the Free Territory of Trieste. The terms of the Italian Peace Treaty include the provision that the United States, Great Britain and Jugoslavia shall each provide forces of 5,000. The announcement of the title for the American force states that it will be known as “Trieste United States Troops” and that they will be referred to as “TRUST”, letters of which are easily understood abbreviation.

### **Old Name Sticks**

Inspiring as the word “TRUST” is, it is the consensus of opinion that the title “Blue Devil Brigade” will be the more familiar one among ourselves and our friends, because the term “Blue Devils” has been an honored one in United States Army circles ever since the 88th Division won it by the fury of its fighting in the Apennines. Blue Devils of today’s 88th Division are supplying practically all of the personnel for the Trieste Force, to be activated when the Peace Treaty becomes effective following its ratification.

Major General Bryant E. Moore has been named as Commander of “TRUST”. General Moore continues simultaneously in his job as Commanding General of the 88th Division. The 88th is still fulfilling its mission along the Morgan Line and will continue to do so until its forces are withdrawn, following ratification, in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty.

General Moore’s deputy commander for the Blue Devil Brigade will be Brigadier General Ridgely B. Gaither, the Assistant Division Commander of the 88th. Chief of Staff of “TRUST” is to be Colonel Eric S. Molitor, now the 88th Division Artillery Commander. The present Chief of Staff of the 88th Division, Colonel Numa A. Watson, former Commander of the 13th Infantry Regiment in combat with the 8th Division will assume command of the infantry regiment which will be the largest unit of the Blue Devil Brigade and the backbone of the 5,000 man American force. At this time it has not been announced who will be the other members of the General Staff.

It now appears that most of the United States Troops will be billeted in the northern part of the Free Territory. There will be a few troops in the city. Preparations have already been made for dock and warehouse facilities near the waterfront, and for bringing in supplies.

### **Special Service Plans**

Special Service has already made arrangements for the preparation of an extensive program of sports and other various forms of amusements. They are preparing fine beach facilities at Sistiana and will provide one officer and one enlisted man who will devote their full time to the promotion of sports. Special Service will make arrangements for tours and

for all other kinds of entertainment for the troops.

Besides what Special Service is doing, the Red Cross Club is planning two additional clubs in the Free Territory. One club is already in the city of Trieste, another is going to open soon in Opicina and still another is planned for the waterfront at Sistiana as a beach club. The building in Opicina was formerly a British NAAFI club and has a beautiful view of the city of Trieste and the surrounding vicinity.

### **Newspaper, Radio Station Move**

It is expected that the Blue Devil Newspaper and the Blue Devil Radio Station will soon be moved to Trieste. After Ratification Day these facilities will provide news and air entertainment in the Free Territory on a scale similar to their long service during occupation.

The Army Exchange Service is also setting up in Trieste. They are at this time preparing PXs for the men to be stationed in the Free Territory. Just before the last move to Trieste, the Gorizia and other stores will close and move their stock to the Free Territory. Extra rations will probably be issued before this move takes place.

Arrangements have also been made for a large well equipped hospital. All supplies, spare parts and accessories for the hospital will be ready in Trieste when the opening day arrives.

## **Chicago Herald-American, March 23, 1947**

### **GORIZIA**

*by E. F. Tompkins*

Near Gorizia the iron curtain is visible in actuality. A few miles east of the city the Morgan Line—a temporary military line of demarcation—runs north and south through steep barren hills. Where the line intersects the primitive tortuous highways, road blocks have been set up; and at these points the totalitarian east confronts the democratic west in warlike manner.

For here, at Gorizia is one of the world's most strategic spots, a spot so important in history and in world politics that our military government in Europe has put one of the most formidable combat organizations on guard. In Venezia Giulia the Eighty-eighth division—the famous "Blue Devils" of the Italian campaign—remains on foreign duty. Commanded now by Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, a veteran of the Pacific war who led the 164th Infantry Regiment ashore at Guadalcanal, the Eighty-eighth holds sixty miles of the Morgan Line, which bisects the upper reaches of Venezia Giulia.

In this often embattled sector, Gorizia is a conqueror's prize because it provides a natural gateway into the Isonzo valley and down through the Carso passes into vulnerable Italy.

Marshall Tito has attempted twice to obtain Gorizia for Yugoslavia-and for Soviet Russia. The first attempt was by invasion toward the end of the late war. This effort failed when New Zealand troops reached beleaguered Trieste in time to receive the surrender of its German garrison, while American troops were marching victoriously north into Austria. Tito was compelled to accept the Morgan Line and to withdraw his advanced forces from Gorizia pending peace determinations.

Tito's next attempt was by barter. Through Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader, he offered to forego his claims to Trieste in return for a gift to him of Gorizia-a shrewd proposal which Italy rejected.

### **All Victories for Russia**

Now, however, Soviet diplomacy is about to accomplish what Tito was unable to achieve by either attack or guile. On Feb. 10 four peace treaties were signed at Paris-with Italy, with Romania, with Bulgaria and with Hungary. In terms of economic benefits and of territorial advantages all of these treaties are diplomatic victories for Soviet Russia.

The Italian treaty must also be reckoned as military triumph for Communism. America has a particular interest in the Italian settlement. First, with the ratification of the Paris agreement our watch in Venezia Giulia will come to an end. The Eighty-eighth Division is to be withdrawn and brought home in July.

Second, while the negotiations were still in progress at Paris, the Italian premier, Alcide de Gasperi's (unreadable) in Washington and obtained a loan of one hundred million dollars for rehabilitation of his country. And, by a strange coincidence, under (unreadable) treaty Soviet Russia is to collect from Italy a war indemnity of exactly one hundred million dollars.

Third, the Paris treaty takes away from Italy and bestows up Yugoslavia-Soviet Russia's strongest communistic satellite-a large portion of the province of Venezia Giulia, dominating the entire eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea.

### **Red Mediterranean Power**

This territorial cession delivers to Communism virtually the whole Austrian peninsula, containing the ample ports of Pola and Fiume, and makes Soviet Russia a Mediterranean power.

During the post-war period the disputed city of Trieste has been administered as a free zone under and American military governor, Col A. C. Bowman, of Los Angeles. Trieste, and a narrow surrounding strip, will remain "free"-but under the direction of a European governor-and will at best exist as a mere enclave inside the new Yugoslav borders, subject to Communist intrigue and infiltration, and-the non-Communist population fears-political kidnappings and terrorism.

Regarding the brief period of Tito's ascendancy in Venezia Giulia, a semi-official document says: "It is believed there were at least 8,000 persons arrested in Trieste and deported to Yugoslavia and that nothing has been heard of them since." "In Gorizia there were about 2,000 arrested, 1,800 of whose whereabouts is still unknown."

## **Way Open for Invasion**

Fourth, although (unreadable)mland (unreadable)nter of Gorizia continues under the Italian flag. It will be surround on three sides by Yugoslav territory.

Finally, Italy is to have an army limited to 180,000 men with a small fighter air force, while there is no limitation of either Yugoslav or Soviet armaments. In a Communist invasion Italy would be undertaken by way of Gorizia and Tito's Red allies on Italian soil. Today, by virtue of the treaty signed at Paris, a new dark age looms behind the same horizon-the dark age of aggressive Communism.

## **Intelligence Review, Issue 59**

**3 Apr 47, pp. 17-24**

### **Feature Section**

#### **The Security Council and Trieste**

The Free Territory of Trieste, located at the head of the Adriatic Sea, between Italy and Yugoslavia (See map on page 18.), has an area of 310 square miles; and its population is approximately 350,000, of whom 260,000 reside in the city of Trieste and 90,000 in the outlying areas. Approximately 75 percent are Italians, 20 percent are Slovenes, and the rest are of other nationalities.

The Territory's chief importance lies in its excellent port, which, with its rail connections, forms the best gateway between Central Europe and the Mediterranean. It is strategically important because Soviet power would be extended to the upper Adriatic and to the Italian frontier, if the Yugoslavs were able to establish control over the Territory. Thus, Soviet control over Austria and Czechoslovakia would be increased.

#### **History**

From medieval times until the end of World War I, with only a brief interruption in Napoleon's era, Trieste was under Austro-Hungarian domination. From about 1870 until 1914, it grew to its present position as a major port. The opening of the Suez Canal and the increased industrialization of Central Europe played a large part in its growth. Since Trieste was its best seaport, the Austro-Hungarian Empire fostered its development in every possible way. The Empire spent huge sums on railroads and port facilities, set very low freight rates to and from Trieste, and heavily subsidized its merchant marine.

After Trieste was given to Italy in 1918, it never entirely regained its former position in world trade. Since Italy had several other good ports, there was little reason to subsidize Trieste. Much of the Central European trade was shifted to North Sea ports, even though in many cases Trieste was much nearer.

In May 1945, Tito's forces first reached Trieste and overran most of the Venezia Giulia region, making contact with Anglo-American forces under General Harding. No detailed



will depend on: (1) general European recovery; (2) the efficiency of the local government; (3) the willingness of the United Nations and its individual members to back up the Trieste agreement; and (4) the willingness of all her neighbors to cooperate in the revival of Trieste's trade.

### **Operation and Control**

The Council of Foreign Ministers, meeting at Paris in the summer of 1946, agreed to the establishment of a "Free Territory of Trieste" under the sponsorship of the Security Council of the United Nations. The Territory was to be administered by a Governor, appointed by the Security Council and responsible to it. The Foreign Ministers drew up a Provisional Statute and a Permanent Statute, which were incorporated into the Italian Peace Treaty. (See Int. Rev. No. 53, page 16.) The terms of these statutes will be binding on the government of the Territory, and on the governments signing and ratifying the treaty.

An International Commission - consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Switzerland, Austria, Hungary, and the Free Territory—will deal with matters concerning the port, within limitations prescribed by the Permanent Statute.

A Constituent Assembly, popularly elected, will draw up a Constitution, which must be consistent with the Permanent Statute. A Popular Assembly will then be elected. This body will exercise the legislative power and will elect the Council of Government, which will advise and assist the Governor. Until the Permanent Statute is put into effect, the Council will be appointed by the Governor. The Judiciary will at first be appointed by the Governor, but the Constitution may make other provisions for the appointment of judges.

The Governor, who will be neither Italian, Yugoslav, nor a citizen of a Big Four nation, is given broad powers by the Statutes. He will appoint the administrative officials, such as the Chief of Police and the Director of the Port. He also will appoint a Provisional Council of Government. He may suspend laws which, in his opinion, conflict with his responsibilities. In emergencies, when, in his opinion, public order or the independence or integrity of the Territory is threatened, he may take direct command of the police force and "take appropriate measures". How wisely and how resolutely these powers are used will depend of the strength of character and political astuteness of the Governor. The Governor has not yet been chosen, although several candidates for the office have been proposed. (See Int. Rev. No. 53, pages 62 and 63.) It is hoped that he will be agreed upon soon so that, as nearly as possible, he will be ready to take over the government of the territory by the time the treaty is ratified. Ratification should be completed in April or May.

The Free Territory will have no army, navy, or air force of its own. The Governor, upon assuming office, will have at his disposal 15,000 troops, 5,000 each to be furnished by the United States, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia. Each of the three contingents will be under its own commander, who, in turn, will report directly to the Governor. Administrative and logistical matters for the American and British contingents will be handled on a combined command basis under a British commander, who will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. During the period from the day of ratification until the Governor assumes office, any operations undertaken would be in support of the Allied Military Government; therefore, responsibilities assigned to the United States - United Kingdom combined commander have been enlarged to include operational command for the

period mentioned.

The Governor will determine whether the Free Territory will continue to be divided into two zones. Ninety days after assuming office, he will notify the United Nations Security Council whether or not the troops, or a portion of them, are still needed. If needed, the Governor may keep them as long as he sees fit. The over-all duration of their stay is estimated at 4 to 12 months; but, in any case, the troops must withdraw within 45 days of the date he notifies the Security Council that they are no longer required.

After the national contingents have been withdrawn, the government will rely on a police force, recruited from the citizens of the Territory, for the maintenance of law and order. A Gendarmerie also will be selected to guard the borders and, when necessary, to assist the police force.

### Conclusions

Trieste remains a major trouble spot. It is a point where the strategic interests of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union clash. It is an area of bitter Italo-Slav rivalry. It is the chief Mediterranean seaport of Central Europe and, therefore, greatly desired by Eastern and Western Powers. The United Nations will attempt to keep peace by means of a strong Governor, backed throughout the critical period by a joint force. Economically, Trieste may prosper if Europe prospers, or stagnate if its trade is choked off by political maneuvering. As a key to future peace or war, Trieste will bear close watching.

## General Orders Number 1, May 1, 1947

### Establishment of Trieste United States Troops

*Major General Bryant Moore*

HEADQUARTERS TRUST  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
APO 88

1 May 1947

GENERAL ORDERS  
NUMBER 1

Establishment of Trieste United States Troops-----Section I  
Staff assignments Headquarters TRUST-----Section II  
Assumption of Command-----Section III

#### SECTION I

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF TRIESTE UNITED STATES TROOPS

Pursuant to authority contained in Section II, General Order Number 10, Headquarters 88 Infantry Division, 29 April, 1947, announcement is made of the establishment of Trieste United States

Troops (short title TRUST) at Trieste, effective 0001 B hours 1 May 1947.

## SECTION II

### STAFF ASSIGNMENTS HEADQUARTERS TRUST

The following staff assignments for Headquarters United States Troops, are announced:

Colonel ERIC S. MOLITOR, 012115, General Staff Corps, as Chief of Staff

Lieutenant Colonel WALTER P. GOODWIN, 018733, General Staff Corps, as Deputy Chief of Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel JAMES G. HOLLAND JR, 024573, General Staff Corps, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Lieutenant Colonel HOLMAN D HOOVER, 030305, General Staff Corps, as Deputy Chief of Staff - Liaison.

Lieutenant Colonel JAMES E. TYLER, 023079, General Staff Corps, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

Lieutenant Colonel WILLIAM J. McDONNELL, 031698, General Staff Corps, as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

Lieutenant Colonel MARION A. CROMARTIE, 0370559, Adjutant General's Department as Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel JERROLD D. SNOW, 02461, Corps of Engineers, as Engineer Officer.

Major LEON S. BARWICK, 0472128, Finance Department, as Finance Officer.

Major ROBERT W. NEAL, 0308715, Inspector General's Department, as Inspector General.

Lieutenant Colonel VERNON C. RAWLS, 029098, Judge Advocate General's Department, as Judge Advocate.

Maor LELAND C. SHANNORN, 029349, Field Artillery, as director of Information.

Lieutenant Colonel CHARLES A. MOUNT, 0344541, Quartermaster Corps, as Quartermaster.

Major OSCAR W. AKERSTROM, 0395609, Signal Corps, as Signal

Officer.

Lieutenant Colonel SAM J. RASOR, 038769, Infantry, as Army Exchange Officer.

Lieutenant Colonel JOHN B. WHITE, 0236676, Medical Corps, as Surgeon.

Major CARL F. CHIRICO, 029506, Coast Artillery Corps, as Special Service Officer.

Major ALBERT C. BORNEMAN, 0461619, Ordnance Department, as Ordnance Officer.

Chaplain (Captain) CHARLES F. WILLS, 031091, Chaplains Corps, as Chaplain.

### SECTION III

#### ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND

Under the provisions of paragraph 4, AR 600-20, and Section I, General Orders Number 43, Headquarters Mediterranean Theater of Operations, 25 April 1947, the undersigned hereby assumes Command of Trieste United States Troops.

BRYANT E. MOORE  
Major General, U. S. Army  
Commanding

#### DISTRIBUTION:

A & B

## **United Nations Weekly Bulletin, July 1, 1947**

### **Security Council Considers Trieste Governorship**

At the request of the United Kingdom representative, the Security Council considered, on June 20, the question of the appointment of a Governor of Trieste. The discussion was led by Mr. Gromyko, who took the position that the Council could not discuss this matter until the treaty with Italy had been ratified. No decision in the matter

could be taken, he pointed out, until agreement was reached between the four powers participating in the Foreign Ministers' Conference of December 12, 1946.

Sir Alexander Cadogan maintained, however, that, although the Governor could assume office only after the ratification of the treaty, there was nothing to prevent discussion of the appointment by the Council.

In view of the difficulty hitherto experienced by the Four Powers in obtaining unanimity on the question, it would be well for them to sit with the other members of the Council to see whether, with the help of those other members, they could arrive at a satisfactory, unanimous decision in regard to an appropriate candidate. The Council would then be in a position on short notice to appoint that candidate formally at the proper time.

### **“The Specter of the Veto”**

Colonel William R. Hodgson recalled that, at the Paris Peace Conference, the Australian delegation had warned of a deadlock on this question.

The present situation, he said, was in which “the spectre of the veto” kept intruding itself to delay or obstruct the Security Council from making decisions on matters to which the “veto” power could not have been intended to apply. This blocking of decisions was grievously damaging to the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations, and, in this case, one result was the indefinite continuance of conditions of economic and political in the Trieste area.

The Council was concerned only with agreeing upon a selection so as to make a formal appointment at the proper time.

### **View of the United States**

Herschel V. Johnson said that nothing in the Charter, in the Rules of Procedure of the Council, in the pending Italian treaty, or in the Statute for the Government of Trieste could be construed as being a legal bar to a discussion of the matter in the Council.

Mr. Johnson quoted from the protocol of the Council of Foreign Ministers of December 12, 1946, in which it was stated that the governments concerned “will take all possible steps to secure the designation of the Governor of the Free Territory of Trieste at the earliest possible date under the conditions laid down in the draft of the permanent statute so as to insure his appointment by the Security Council simultaneously with the entry into force of the peace treaty.”

Mr. Gromyko insisted that the discussion of this matter should follow the normal procedure set forth by the Council of Foreign Ministers. He would not object to the inclusion of the item in the Council's agenda if the members also decided that the consideration of this item should take place only after the peace treaty with Italy and entered into force.

Sir Alexander Cadogan declared that when on the instructions of his government, he had asked for the inclusion of the item in the agenda, he had done so with the view to its immediate discussion. He therefore pressed for such a discussion.

Alexandre Paroli, the Council's President, then spoke on behalf of the French delegation. He understood Sir Alexander's request to mean that the Council members should have an exchange of views "of an entirely preliminary nature" in which possible nominees for the Governorship of Trieste might be considered. This exchange of opinions and views would enlarge on the consultations which had already taken place among certain members of the Security Council.

Sir Alexander confirmed that correctness of this interpretation, and Mr. Paroli then asked the Council to vote on the adoption of the agenda, which included the question of the appointment of a Governor of Trieste. Nine representatives voted to adopt the agenda, while the representative of the U.S.S.R. voted against and the French representative abstained from voting.

The President then asked for a vote on the question whether the matter of the appointment of the Trieste Governor should be discussed in closed session. The vote was 9 in favor of such a procedure, with abstentions on the part of the U.S.S.R. and Australia.

The closed session was held in the afternoon of June 20, 1947.

## **The Cleveland Press, August 19, 1947**

### **Two Years After—Good Ad for Peacetime Army Found in Troops at Trieste**

*by Robert C. Ruark*

#### **TRIESTE:**

If you happened to be shopping around for really good advertisement for the peacetime Army, I think that'd find it here, in Maj. Gen. Bryant Moore's TRUST (Trieste U.S. Troops).

TRUST, pulled partly from the 88th Division, which as been maintaining near-combat conditions on the Yugoslav border, and recruited partly from other outfits back home, will be the permanent garrison in this hotspot. It will number an even 5000 men.

TRUST makes you just about as proud of your armed forces as Lieut. Gen. John C. H. Lee's installation at Leghorn turns your stomach with shame. TRUST is a completely convincing illustration of what the Army can produce when it decides to run a neat operation.

The TRUST guys are chosen men, from Gen. Moore down to the Pfc's. Recently, more than 1000 men have been screened and shipped off as unfit for the duty of showing the flag in a delicate diplomatic territory. The officers are handpicked back in the States, and are given a careful combing when they arrive. This outfit takes itself seriously.

There is plenty of spit-and-polish, but it is a shared sharpness, unlike the comic-opera decorum down in Leghorn, where men are turned into buffoons to gratify rank-mad

desk commandos. Five thousand Americans are stationed in and around Trieste, but the town itself is unravished by an overload of soldiers. No MP's are stuck in the streets, ostensibly to direct traffic, but in reality to throw salutes. TRUST leaves the town's direction to the civilians.

I have never seen soldiers more sharply turned out and as beautifully disciplined without being hammered-down. The ones I saw fulfilled every requirement of crack troops, and they did it naturally, as if they'd thought it up themselves. Morale is a much kicked-about word, it you can smell it through a mountain-and not the lack of it just as easily.

I also believe I never saw enlisted men better housed and fed and cared for than in Trieste. I made two surprise calls on the First and Second Battalions of the 351st Regiment, quartered outside Trieste in the little Jug town of Opicina. It was a Saturday afternoon, which means letdown after the usual inspection. Then, if ever, you find sloppiness, and I found none.

What I found was comfortable quarters for all hands, in the big stone barracks, with adequate, attractive dayrooms for lounging, and a mess hall that would shame many a Stateside tearoom.

The sergeants had constructed their own mess; it topped the average officer's club. The lower ranks ate off white china and tablecloths; there were flowers on the table and gay curtains at the windows. They ate such things as fresh beef and tomatoes, watermelon and cantaloupe, seafood and all sorts of local fruits and vegetables.

At Second Battalion Headquarters, the recreational facilities included a night club which runs seven nights a week, and for which selected Italian girls are furnished as dancing partners. There was an indoor movie, a fine library, ping-pong and billiard rooms, a huge PX, and several well-equipped handicraft rooms. There is now a whisky and beer allowance for the EM as well as the officers.

Maj. L. C. Shannon of Denver, Colo., took me through the installation and allowed me to pick my spots. The major said he wasn't worried about anything I'd find, and he was right. Every enlisted man combined the desired military courtesy with the old easy good humor that you used to see in close-knit combat troops.

Later, I met a flock of officers—mostly young captains and majors, ex-reserves, and got some of the answer for the perfection of the troops. A more serious, sober flock of commissions I never ran across.

Since I spent most of last week beating on the head of Gen. Lee's outfit, I'm doubly tickled to lay in a loud plug for Gen. Moore's show at Trieste. It convinced me, anyhow, that you can make something beside a sad comedy out of a peacetime military organization—and last week I felt it was just the other way around.